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PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER OUTSIDERS
EDMOND R. ANDERSON JR.*
The law of personal jurisdiction over outsiders--julisdiction in per-
soa m over nonresident defendants-has been one of the basic areas in the
American development of Conflict of Laws.- Increasing mobility and com-
plexity in business organizations and relationships have provoked recent
rapid changes in this law,2 which threaten to efface state boundaries. One
moving force has been the "new look" in fourteenth amendment due process;
the United States Supreme Court fosters flexible standards and refuses
to draw lines in these cases.5 Another has been the statutory groping of
state legislators to favor their constituents.4 This article is intended to
present the development and current highlights in the American picture
and to indicate what is taking place in Missouri.
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction has been called a "talismanic word," 5 even though it is
generally thought to be something sound, something we can depend upon.
It is actually little more than a functional concept with certain practical
limits. A court must have "jurisdiction" in order to enforce any judgment
or decree rendered; the court will need something or somebody to act
upon. This something or somebody takes the form of local property or a
person from which an aggrieved party to a law suit can obtain satisfaction.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri; A.B., Ohio State Uni-
versity, 1948; LL.B., University of Illinois, 1953; Resident as candidate for J.S.D.,
Columbia University Law School, 1961-62; member of the bar, California, Illinois
and Missouri.
1. The American development is apparently unique. EHRENZWEIG, CoNFLIcT
OF LAWS § 25 (1962).
2. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
3. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. E.g., ILL. Civ. PRec. ACT §§ 16-17; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16-17 (1963).
5. Justice Frankfurter in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 189 (1947). Cf.
Justice Rutledge, dissenting, in Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226, 258
(1945): "Domicil thus combines the essentially contradictory elements of perma-
nence and instantaneous change. No legal conception, save possibly 'jurisdiction,'
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Another limit, as it has developed in American law, is the policy precluding
courts from rendering advisory opinions in private litigation., The issuance
of advisory opinions is generally confined to the executive branch of gov-
ernment. The demands of the parties in a law suit determine the functional
conception-jurisdiction. The plaintiff must be able to get the defendant
into court. In the case of nonresident defendants, the plaintiff wants the
-defendant before a convenient and appropriate court. Traveling across the
continent, or into the next state, to bring suit often will be inconvenient,
and even inappropriate-depending upon what the suit is about. Suit in
another state may be impractical, for the court as well as the parties7
The conception of jurisdiction, shifting with the times, forms the method
for bringing the defendant into an appropriate local court.
A number of American courts today have evolved a conception of
jurisdiction which will protect local plaintiffs almost to the hilt. Other
American courts have chosen to remain more cautious; the reasons are
not readily apparent, though perhaps it is simply a matter of their not
keeping up with the rapid development in the law. A state court need not
exercise personal jurisdiction over outsiders., Today's widespread, sometimes
reckless, state or federal court jurisdiction over defendants resident in
other states weakens state sovereignty, much in the same way that en-
croaching federal power does; the states in which these defendants reside
are less able to protect their interestsY
Jurisdiction over something and somebody has been roughly categorized
jurisdiction in rem and jurisdiction in personam. These distinctions are not
clear cut, and further refinements arise, such as jurisdiction quasi in rein
and in tke -nature of a proceeding in rem.1 ° This article will not become
6. Accord, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
7. The principle of forum -on conveniens has thus developed. Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 292 S.W.2d 589
(Div. 2, 1956).
8. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
9. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: a Review, 25' U.
Cmr. L. Rv. 569 (1958); Cf. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502(4th Cir. 1956). Once a judgment, unassailable on jurisdictional grounds, is ob-
tained against the outsider, it then may be enforced against him in his own state
under the "inexorable command" of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CoNsT.
art. IV. § 1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958). Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947);
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Parker v. Hoefer, 2 N.Y.2d 612, 142
N.E.2d 194, 162 N.Y.S.2d 13, cert. denied 355 U.S. 833 (1957).
10. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); cf.
Williams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d
796, 221 P.2d 1 (1950).
19631
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss3/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
bogged down with these nebulous terms; jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, jurisdiction in personam as generally understood-concerned
with a court's acting upon persons, human or artificial-is the sole subject.11
Jurisdiction based upon control over property, whether technically in rem
or not, is beyond the scope of this article.
Under the protection of fourteenth amendment due process, two dis-
tinct requirements have evolved in the American law of personal jurisdic-
tion.12 The court must have some basis for acting upon the outsider and
certain procedural safeguards must be undertaken and satisfied to protect
his rights:
It is elementary that for a court to entertain an action in
personam against a foreign defendant, jurisdiction over the "per-
son" must be acquired. Traditionally, this has comprised two
elements: (1) the power to subject him to the jurisdiction of the
court, and (2) effectively bringing him before the court by proper
notice. .... 13
The important recent developments are in the area of the first require-
ment: the power-basis for the court to act upon the nonresident defendant.
That forms the primary concern in this article. An example, to distinguish
these requirements, involves "service upon an agent." Serving a local
agent is not a power-basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. Local service
upon the principal would be.1 4 Nonetheless, service upon the agent may
provide adequate notice to the principal satisfying requisite procedural
safeguards.1 There is some tendency to confuse or jumble these require-
11. There is no intent to suggest that in rem jurisdiction is less important or
valuable to the practitioner. Even where personal jurisdiction can or may be ob-
tained over an outsider, attachment or garnishment proceedings against a local
debtor of the outsider is advantageous to prevent procedural delays and speed col-
lection of an ultimate judgment. Cf. Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 454,
106 S.E.2d 704 (1959). Where personal jurisdiction fails or is blocked, the possi-
bility of attachment of accounts receivable, bank accounts, or other intangible or
tangible assets claimed by or owed to the outsider within local jurisdiction should
not be overlooked. Cf. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Home In-
surance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Pennington v. Fourth National Bank of
Cincinnati, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
12. Similar requirements exist in the law of in rem jurisdiction. Walker v. City
of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); State v. Stringer, 77 Wyo. 198, 310 P.2d 730
(1957); cf. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); A/S Krediit
Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F.Supp. 300 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
13. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 505 (4th Cir. 1956);
accord, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457 (1940).
14. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, supra note 13.
15. Ibid.; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 13.
[Vol. 28
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ments-this may be a part of the recent development in the American
law. As a New Jersey court has stated:
The trend in defining due process is away from the court having
immediate power over a defendant and towards the court in which
both parties may conveniently settle their dispute. And in defining
due process of law, the trend is away from emphasis on territorial
limitations and towards emphasis on providing adequate notice and
opportunity to be heard .... 16
By and large, the courts still fit the changing law into these established
requirements. The power-basis requirement has become sufficiently flexible
for the purpose.
The most simplified jurisdiction over outsiders has been grounded upon
local authority, and this has taken the form of service of process upon
the nonresident defendant in the state. In suits against individual de-
fendants, jurisdiction over the person of the individual is acquired when
he is served personally with the summons in the state; it makes no difference
why he is there.'7 He can be served in an airplane flying over the state.'8
A nonresident corporation, however, cannot be so served; jurisdiction over
foreign corporations is more complicated. Perhaps, if all the directors,
officers, and shareholders of a foreign corporation were individually served
in a state, there would be a rough equivalent to service upon an individual
defendant in the state, supplying the requisite power-basis for the court
to act. But this never happens. Foreign corporations are more insulated
16. Hoagland v. Springer, 75 N.J. Super. 560, 568, 183 A.2d 678, 683 (App.
Div. 1962); cf. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569,
80 A.2d 664 (1951); Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 285 (1958); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Ride of Personal JTuris-
diction; The "Power" Mytl& and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956).
Justice Traynor of the Supreme Court of California has stated: "Why should they
[judges] not be free to consider jurisdiction at the outset in the complex of the
parties' contacts with the forum state, the interests of the state concerned in the
outcome, and a pervading concept of fair play to all parties?" Traynor, Is This Con-
flict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 660 (1959).
17. This so-called "transient rule" of personal jurisdiction received its im-
petus from Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Cf. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905).
18. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F.Supp. 442, 443 (E.D. Ark. 1959): "... The
Marshal's return as to Smith recites that the writ came to hand on July 21, 1958,
and that on the same day he served the same 'by personally delivering to him a
copy of this writ, together with a copy of the Complaint, on the Braniff Airplane,
Flight No. 337, non-stop flight from Memphis, Tenn. to Dallas, Texas, said copy
being delivered to him at 5:16 P.M. at which time the said airplane was in the
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from such simplified jurisdiction than nonresident individuals, apparently
as an outgrowth of earlier notions that corporations could not act or exist
outside the states in which they were legally qualified, as announced by
Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Augusta v. Earle (U.S. 1839)."g This in-
congruity suggests a flaw in the basic theory of personal jurisdiction. There
is no reason why foreign corporations should have such an insulating ad-
vantage as compared with nonresident individuals. Stockholder protection
is sufficiently assured by the policy of limited corporate liability. The
premise that personal jurisdiction can be obtained simply by handing an
outsider a summons in the forum needs reconsideration,2 0 but, at least,
if a nonresident individual can be sued locally in that manner, some
method should be evolved in the law whereby foreign corporations also
can be so sued. Present law does not permit local suit against a foreign
corporation even if the president, vice-president, or general manager of
the corporation is served there with process, unless some other power-basis
for jurisdiction is shown.21 Service upon responsible officers of this sort
might be held sufficient, particularly when they are in the state for reasons
related to the suit or its subject matter. Current bases of jurisdiction,
getting around this foreign corporate insulation from local service by
indirect devices, have failed to meet the problem.
The involvement of the U.S. Constitution, primarily fourteenth
amendment due process, and in rare instances the interstate commerce
clause, with state law determining personal jurisdiction has posed problems.
19. 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 519 (1839). The significance of the court and date of
decision in the area of personal jurisdiction over outsiders is such that it was
thought advisable to include a designation with the style of the case the first time
each case was named in the body of the article.
20. Professor Ehrenzweig has vigorously attacked this premise, Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Mytk and Forum Con-
veniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956), and his views have made some impression on
other writers. Leflar, Cleary, and others, Transient Jurisdiction--Remnant of Pen-
noyer v. Neff: A Round Table, 9 J. PuB. L. 281 (1960); Briggs, Contemporary
Problems in Conflict of Laws-jurisdiction by Statute, Part II, 24 Morr. L. Rv.
85 (1963).
21. Blount v. Peerless Chem., Inc., 316 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1963) [service upon
president, who resided locally]; Long v. Victor Prod. Corp., 297 F.2d 577 (8th Cir.
1961) [service upon chairman of the board and a vice-president temporarily lodged
at a hotel in the state]; Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502 (4th
Cir. 1956) [service upon general manager, who had come to the state to discuss
the complaint sued upon); Pucci v. Blatz Brewing Co., 127 F.Supp. 747 (W.D. Mo.
1955) [service upon a vice-president temporarily lodged at a hotel in the state];
Collar v. Peninsular Gas Co., 295 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. Div. 1, 1956) [service upon
president temporarily lodged at a hotel in the state on business which became the
subject matter of the suit].
[Vol'. 28
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State law formulates the extent of local jurisdiction subject to shifting
minimum constitutional requirements. As the late Judge Goodrich has
written:
There are two parts to the question whether a foreign corpora-
tion can be held subject to suit within a state. The first is a ques-
tion of state law: has the state provided for bringing the foreign
corporation into its courts under the circumstances of the case
presented? There is nothing to compel a state to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation unless it chooses to do so, and the
extent to which it so chooses is a matter for the law of the state
as made by its legislature. If the state has purported to exercise
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation, then the question may
arise whether such attempt violates the due process clause or the
interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution. Const. art.
1, § 8, cl. 3; Amend. 14. This is a federal question and, of course,
the state authorities are not controlling. But it is a question which
is not reached for decision until it is found that the State statute
is broad enough to assert jurisdiction over the defendant in a
particular situation.22
In addition, the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins (U.S. 1938)2
created the question whether local state law, in diversity of citizenship
cases, governs the jurisdiction of federal courts in that state. Erie pre-
cipitated a line of decisions in which the Supreme Court ruled that
uniformity of outcome was required among federal and state courts within
each state. Angel v. Bullington (U.S. 1947)24 and Woods v. Interstate
Realty Co. (U.S. 1949)2 5 extended this rule to certain jurisdictional issues.
Lower federal courts then tried to follow the law of their state in deter-
mining personal jurisdiction.2 The Supreme Court never ruled on the
precise issue, but in one case, Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products
Corp. (U.S. 1956),27 threw a monkey wrench, probably inadvertently, into
this developing body of law.28 Some federal courts thereafter ruled that in
22. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1948)
(Goodrich, Circuit Judge, by special assignment), quoted and followed in Arrow-
smith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1963) and Sanders Assoc.,
Inc. v. Galion Iron Works & Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 915, 918-19 (1st Cir. 1962).
23. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
25. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
26. E.g., Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1955); Canvas
Fabricators, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952);
Hilmes v. Marlin Firearms Co., 136 F.Supp. 307 (D. Minn. 1955).
27. 350 U.S. 1003, 1012 (1956) (per curiam, memo opinion).
28. Riverbank Lab. v. Hardwood Prod. Corp., 236 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1956).
19631
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determining personal jurisdiction federal law should be applied rather than
the local state law. 2 9 By 1963, however, the federal courts were almost
unanimous in the view that local state law determines personal jurisdiction
in diversity cases.30
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS IT HAS DEVELOPED IN AMERICAN LAW
A. The Leading Cases
In Pennoyer v. Neff (U.S. 1878),31 the Supreme Court ruled that per-
sonal jurisdiction could not be obtained over a nonresident individual by
service of process outside the forum state. "Process from the tribunals
of one State cannot run into another State, and summon parties there
domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them.""32
Thus, an individual defendant had to be served in the forum state, unless
he was a domiciliary thereof and temporarily resident elsewhere. 3 Certain
other exceptions were stated by the Court: "cases affecting the personal
status of the plaintiff, and cases in which that mode of service may be
considered to have been assented to in advance."3 4 The Court also indi-
cated that a state may require a nonresident,
entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or
making contracts enforceable there, to appoint an agent or repre-
sentative in the State to receive service of process and notica in
legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership, asso-
ciation, or contracts, or to designate a place where such service may
be made and notice given, and provide, upon their failure, to make
such appointment or to designate such place that service may be
made upon a public officer designated for that purpose, or in
some other prescribed way.35
These principles were applied for many years to ground personal juris-
diction on fictive "consent" to local suit, "doing business" locally, and
29. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960); K.
Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
30. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), overrtding
the contrary holding in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., supra note 29. Cf.
Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963).
31. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
32. Id. at 727.
33. Local jurisdiction over the forum's domiciliaries, wherever they may be
found and served, was made clear by Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
34. Supra note 31 at 733.
35. Id. at 735.
[Vol. 28
7
Anderson: Anderson: Personal Jurisdiction over Outsiders Symposium:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
local "presence. '3 6 Nonresident individuals, as citizens under the privileges
and immunities clause,37 could not be excluded from a particular state, and
thus were not deemed to have "consented" to personal jurisdiction by reason
of their presence, existence, or activity there.38 In suits on causes of action
arising locally, foreign corporations were deemed to have consented.39 Much
of the time, foreign corporations legally qualified to do local business (thus
becoming "licensed" to do business in the state), and, as a consequence,
were forced to designate a local agent upon whom service could be had.4 0
But, whether the corporation legally qualified or not, its local presence,
existence, or activity, if substantial in the sense required, rendered it sub-
ject to local jurisdiction by "constructive service"41 under the "consent" or
"doing business" tests. In the case of individual outsiders, other than in
the nonresident motorist situation where "consent" to local suit was rec-
ognized, 42 jurisdiction by constructive service could be had only when
they were "doing business" there in the substantial sense required so as to
establish a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction on that ground.43
The Pernoyer case laid a territorial framework for personal jurisdiction.
Outsiders could be subjected to local suit only in the event they committed
conduct within the forum state, were there in some manner, or consented
36. E.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Philadelphia & Reading Ry.
v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min-
ing Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917); Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1943); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
"In a continuing process of evolution this Court accepted and then abandoned 'con-
sent,' 'doing business,' and 'presence' as the standard for measuring the extent of
state judicial power over such corporations." Justice Black, for the Court, in
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
37. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
38. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
39. Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Smolik v. Philadelphia &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S.D. N.Y. 1915); cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352, 355 (1927) (dictum).
40. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.106, 157.109-.111 (1963); §§ 351.580,
.620, RSMo 1959; § 351.630, RSMo 1961 Supp.
41. "Constructive service" refers to service of process in some manner other
than such as would supply a direct power-basis for the court to act, i.e., other
than traditional "personal service." Examples are: personal service outside the state,
service by mail, service upon an agent-an actual agent or one designated under
the law, or one made such by operation of law (the Secretary of State or other
public official), and service by publication. Courts often use the term "substituted
service" for this purpose. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws, p. 92 (1962).
42. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160
(1916); ef. Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HAuv. L. REv. 563
(1926).
43. Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222 (1948); cf. Scott, Jurisdic-
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to such jurisdiction. Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. (U.S.
1907)" held a foreign corporation not subject to local jurisdiction on a
cause of action arising elsewhere, under the "doing business" or "presence"
tests, when it operated nothing more than a local office, employing an
agent there to solicit freight and passenger business. From the Green case
evolved the so-called "mere solicitation" rule.45 International Harvester v.
Kentucky (U.S. 1914)41 modified this rule to permit local jurisdiction over
such a foreign corporation which, in addition to maintaining a local office
for the solicitation of business, regularly shipped farm machinery into the
state and authorized its local agents to accept payment and notes-payable
for the sale of its products. From the International Harvester case evolved
the "solicitation plus" rule. In other words, a distinction was made, de-
pending upon the kind or extent of local activity, or "doing business."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington (U.S. 1945)47 altered this ter-
ritorial framework. International Shoe, a Delaware corporation, sold mer-
chandise to dealers in the state of Washington by means of salesmen who
solicited orders there and forwarded these orders for acceptance or rejec-
tion to the main office in St. Louis, Missouri. It shipped merchandise into
Washington from warehouses outside that state and made all collections
from outside Washington. International Shoe maintained no office in Wash-
ington, kept no stock of merchandise there, compensated its salesmen on
a commission basis, and denied these salesmen the power to accept orders
or make collections. It did supply its salesmen with a line of samples and
permitted them to rent sample rooms on occasion in hotels or business
buildings in Washington. The Supreme Court held International Shoe
amenable to personal jurisdiction in the state courts of Washington in an
action to collect unemployment compensation taxes on commissions paid
these salesmen. Disdaining prior law, the Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Stone, declared:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a cor-
poration to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply me-
chanical or quantitative. . . . Whether due process is satisfied
must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in
44. 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
45. Followed in People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79
(1918).
46. 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
47. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
[Vol. 28
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relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which
it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause
does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment
in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Cf. Pennoyer v.
Neff, supra; Minnesota Commercial Assn. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140.
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and pro-
tection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise
out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a pro-
cedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought
to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be
undue....
Applying these standards, the activities carried on in behalf
of appellant in the State of Washington were neither irregular
nor casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout the
years in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate
business, in the course of which appellant received the benefits
and protection of the laws of the state, including the right to resort
to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation
which is here sued upon arose out of those very activities. It is
evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties
with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, accord-
ing to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice,
to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has
incurred there. Hence we cannot say that the maintenance of the
present suit in the State of Washington involves an unreasonable
or undue procedure.4 8
The International Shoe case announced a flexible standard governing
state courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations, i.e.,
contacts or ties with the state making it reasonable and just according to
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. This has been called
the "minimum contacts" test. The outsider need only have the requisite
minimum contacts which would support local jurisdiction within American
notions of fair play. In addition, the Court stated:
Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context
of our federal system of government, to require the corporation
to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An "estimate
48. Id. at 319-20.
1963]
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of the inconveniences" which would result to the corporation from
a trial away from its "home" or principal place of business is rel-
evant in this connection. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert . ..9
The emphasis shifted from a territorial framework to fair play. The Court
gave little indication how this standard should be objectively applied, and
state and federal courts have had a field day putting it into operation
ever since.
Some light was shed in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
(U.S. 1952),50 involving a question of personal jurisdiction in the Ohio
courts over a Philippine corporation on a cause of action arising outside
Ohio and unrelated to the corporation's activity there. Driven from min-
ing operations in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation in World
War II, the president of the corporation, who was also the general manager
and principal stockholder, returned to his original home in Ohio and there
conducted corporate affairs including directors' meetings, bank trans-
actions, salary payments, purchases of machinery, and various other lim-
ited activities. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Burton, held
that due process neither required Ohio to take nor to decline jurisdiction.
The continuous systematic activity of the foreign corporation in Ohio was
sufficient grounds for personal jurisdiction, if Ohio wished to exercise it.
On remand, the Ohio court did so.5' The Benguet case purported to follow
International Shoe and indicated that continuous systematic activity in the
forum alone is sufficient minimawr contact under due process notions of fair
play. The fact that the cause of action arose outside Ohio and was unrelated
to the defendant's activity there was not crucial.
Broadside attacks on the Pennoyer territorial framework for personal
jurisdiction came with Travelers Health Association v. Virginia (U.S.
1950),52 and particularly McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (U.S.
1957)." Travelers Health, in an opinion by Justice Black, held that Vir-
ginia could exercise personal jurisdiction over a Nebraska membership
49. Id. at 317. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930),
opinion by Learned Hand, C. J., held, on an "estimate of the inconveniences," that
it would be fairer for the plaintiffs to go to Boston, Massachusetts, to sue the de-
fendant-a Massachusetts corporation which maintained a local office in New York
to discuss stock transactions that were completed in Boston, and did no other
business in New York-than for the defendant to come to the forum court in New
York.
50. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
51. 158 Ohio St. 145, 107 N.E.2d 203 (1952).
52. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
53. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
[Vol. 28
11
Anderson: Anderson: Personal Jurisdiction over Outsiders Symposium:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
insurance corporation based upon the great number of mail order insured
members, approximately 800, in Virginia, despite the fact that no agents
of the Nebraska corporation operated in Virginia. The Nebraska corpora-
tion engaged in continuous long-term insurance transactions with Virginians,
following solicitation based upon the recommendations of fellow Virginia
insured members. The action arose out of an attempt by the state of
Virginia to force Travelers Health to obtain a permit from the state corpora-
tion commission under the Virginia "Blue Sky Law." In McGee, Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co., a Texas corporation, assumed certain life insurance
obligations of a former Arizona insurance corporation, including a policy
with Franklin, a resident of California. International Life, which had not
legally qualified to do business in California and had done no other busi-
ness there, mailed a reinsurance certificate to Franklin in California offer-
ing to insure him, and he accepted by paying premiums by mail from that
state until his death. Thereafter, his beneficiary sought the proceeds under
the policy, but International Life refused to pay, claiming Franklin had
committed suicide. The beneficiary sued in a California court, basing juris-
diction on a California statute which subjected foreign insurance companies
to local suit on insurance contracts on the life of and delivered to residents
of that state.5 The beneficiary recovered judgment and sought to enforce
it in a Texas court. The Texas courts refused, holding the judgment void
under the fourteenth amendment by reason of the California court's lack of
personal jurisdiction over International Life. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Black, reversed, holding the California court had juris-
diction and that Texas must enforce the judgment under the full faith and
credit clause. The Court recognized that Pennoyer v. Neff placed limits
upon the power to exercise personal jurisdiction over outsiders, but thought
International Shoe indicated a trend toward expanding the scope of per-
missible state jurisdiction, and that this case fit the iminimum contacts test
announced in that case, since the insurance contract had a substantial con-
nection with California and that state had "a manifest interest in provid-
ing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse
to pay claims." 5 It would have been inconvenient for the beneficiary to
pursue International Life to Texas and though "there may be inconvenience
54. CAL. INs. CoDE §§ 1610-1620, "Actions Against Nonadmitted Insurers"
which authorizes service of process upon the state insurance commissioner, typical
of such unauthorized insurers process acts.
55. Supra note 53 at 223.
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to the insurer if it is held amenable to suit in California where it had this
contract," there was "certainly nothing which amounts to a denial of due
process."' 6 Travelers Health and McGee make it clear that a foreign cor-
poration need not act within the forum state through agents, let alone
commit acts there itself. The flexible minimwnnr contacts test can be satisfied
though the foreign corporation has never been in the forum state. It need
only submit in some manner by its conduct outside the forum state.
In Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt (U.S. 1957) 5 7 and Hanson v. Denckla
(U.S. 1958),r s the Court rendered opinions denying personal jurisdiction.
Vanderbilt held a Nevada court could not deprive Patricia Vanderbilt of
her right to alimony or support, without personal service upon her in
Nevada or her appearance in the divorce action there brought by her
then husband Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr. The divorce was good, Nevada
courts having jurisdiction for that purpose, but to bind Mrs. Vanderbilt
in such a manner would be giving the divorce in personam effect.59 Hanson v.
Denckla, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, held that Florida could
not exercise personal jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee, as a consequence
of local probate of the will of a Florida domiciliary and jurisdiction over the
beneficiaries contesting for the trust assets there, when the Delaware
trustee did nothing in the state of Florida to bring it within the power
of Florida courts. The Delaware trustee's only contact with Florida came as
a result of its dealings with the decedent, who moved from Pennsylvania to
Florida after she had created the trust some years earlier in Delaware. The
opinion stated:
it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws. International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . 6
The cause of action had not arisen out of any relationship instigated or
consummated by the Delaware trustee in Florida, and thus McGee could
be distinguished. The Court recognized that "territorial limitations on the
power of the respective States" remain a practical fact of life in the United
56. Id. at 224.
57. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
58. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
59. The Supreme Court has rendered a number of recent decisions protecting
nonresident wives and mothers in their rights to support and custody of children.
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528
(1953); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
60. Supra note 58 at 253.
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States.61 An argument made in the dissent by Justice Black,62 that Florida
had sufficient interest in the estate of decedent, a Florida domiciliary at
the time of her death, and that disposition of the estate "had a very close
and substantial connection with that State," since the beneficiaries lived
there, to enable Florida courts to exercise jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee in order to determine the rights of the contesting beneficiaries, was
rejected by the Court: Florida "does not acquire . . . jurisdiction by being
the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location
for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is
resolved in this case by considering the acts of the trustee."63
International Skoe, Benguet, Travelers Healtk, and McGee, even as
somewhat confined by Vanderbilt and Denckla, manifest the Supreme Court's
support for expanded local jurisdiction over outsiders by the increasing
flexibility given the power-basis requirement. Even if the minimum con-
tacts test "was not so much an innovation on due process as it was a re-
phrasing of the prevailing fictional tests, in order more properly to describe
the judicial methodology long employed,"" it hastened the erosion of terri-
torial rigidity, broadened the jurisdictional sights of judges and legisla-
tors, and led to narrow particularizing of power-bases. Minimum contacts
became minimal." "Fair play and substantial justice" allowed greater and
greater leeway as mobility in transportation and the interstate complexity
of business relationships increased. The Supreme Court apparently will
check this expansion only in the exceptional case like Denckla or in a
special situation like Vanderbilt.
There may be a rationale in these leading cases that could be reduced
to "black letter" law. A Montana lawyer suggests three elements must be
present in varying degrees to support personal jurisdiction over outsiders:
some governmental interest in the forum, local trial convenience, and a
purposeful act of the outsider creating some contact with the forum.6 A
61. Id. at 251.
62. Id. at 256, 258-59. (5 to 4 decision)
63. Id. at 254. Cf. Reese and Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences
as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L. REv. 249 (1959); Scott, Comment:
Hanson v. Denckla, 72 H.Av. L. REv. 695 (1958).
64. Sobeloff, C.J., in Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 506
(4th Cir. 1956); cf. Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in
Our Federal System, 43 CORN. L. Q. 196 (1957).
65. In Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F.Supp. 155, 158(E.D. La. 1958), the court even recognized the contact was "minimal."
66. Towe, Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents and Montana's New
Rule 4B, 24 MONT. L. REv. 3 (1962).
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Montana law professor believes a deeper factor determines the decisions--
"institutional affiliation": the business or social relationship involved in
the case, giving rise to the issue of jurisdiction, may or may not be affiliated
with the forum so as to point to the. exercise or denial of jurisdiction.67
There seems to be a forum interest factor, arising by "institutional affilia-
tion" or otherwise, and some required local (or locally consummated) activity
involved in the cases: where jurisdiction was recognized, either the forum's
interest was found sufficient or the outsider's local activity stressed, or both,
and each was present to some degree; where jurisdiction was denied, one
or the other or both were insignificant or lacking.68 But the factors of forum
interest and the outsider's local activity are rather vague generalizations
and, at most, refinements of the conception-minimum contacts. A proper
picture of the law can be derived only by a consideration of subsequent
state and federal court cases applying the minimum contacts test.
A quick look at the law regarding the other fundamental due process
requirement for personal jurisdiction over outsiders, procedural safeguards,
is necessary for a broader picture first, however. Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. (U.S. 1950)9 involved the jurisdiction of a New York
court over great numbers of beneficiaries of a common trust fund estab-
lished under New York law and being administered there, in an action by
the trustee for settlement of its account, many of these beneficiaries being
67. Briggs, Contemporary Problems in Conflict of Laws-Jurisdction by
Statute, Part I, 24 OHio ST. L. J. 223 (1963). For example, in McGee, the insur-
ance relationship as an institution was affiliated with California; whereas in Denckla,
the trust relationship was affiliated with Delaware, where the settlor created it and
presumably intended it to be administered, and had no comparable affiliation with
Florida.
68. In International Shoe, local activity was stressed, and Washington had an
interest in protecting its unemployment compensation fund by assuring that all
employers paying compensation for local services contribute; in Benguet, local ac-
tivity was stressed, and Ohio had an interest in assuring that outsiders conducting
such activity there may be sued locally; in Travelers Health, locally consummated
activity in the insuring of a great number of Virginians was stressed, and Virginia's
interest in regulating such an insurance company as it does local companies, clear;
in McGee, International Life's consummation of the local insurance relationship was
stressed, as was California's interest in protecting its local beneficiary against the
insurer who refused to pay a claim; whereas, in Denckla, the Delaware trustee's ac-
tivity or consummated activity in Florida was virtually nil, and Florida's interest
questionable, when the trust was created and administered in Delaware and the
whole litigation involved only a fight between various groups of beneficiaries for a
little larger share of the decedent's estate; and in Vanderbilt, the outsider Patricia
Vanderbilt committed no activity and consummated nothing whatever. in Nevada,
and any interest that state had in her support rights, or even Cornelius Vander-
bilt's immunity from her support, does not appear. Most of the subsequent state
and federal court decisions, considered infra, can also be explained in this manner.
69. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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nonresidents of New York. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Jackson, found sufficient power-basis for the New York court to act on the
rights of the outsiders, by the interest of that state "in providing means to
close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under
the supervision of its courts,' 1 0 but questioned whether the statute-prescribed
notice by publication in a local newspaper, which only named the par-
ticipating trusts and did not name the beneficiaries, met requisite procedural
safeguards. As to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence,
the Court ruled that due process required at least notice by mail, but as
to unknown beneficiaries or those whose interests were "so remote as to be
ephemeral," notice by publication was sufficient. The Court thought due
process required "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections," "or, where conditions do not
reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less
likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary sub-
stitutes."71 Wuclter v. Pizzutti (U.S. 1928)72 involved personal jurisdic-
tion in a New Jersey court over a Pennsylvanian under the New Jersey
nonresident motorist statute, which provided for constructive service upon
the Secretary of State of New Jersey, but contained no express statutory
requirement that the outsider be notified either by the Secretary of State
or by the plaintiff. The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, reversed
a New Jersey court's exercise of jurisdiction, even though the defendant
Pennsylvanian had been personally served in Pennsylvania. The Court
thought due process required that the statute provide the requisite pro-
cedural safeguard of notice to the outsider, and absent this, the statutory
exercise of jurisdiction could not be sustained. The statute itself must "con-
tain a provision making it reasonably probable that notice of the service on
the Secretary will be communicated to the non-resident defendant who is
sued."'' 7 In other words, if jurisdiction over an outsider is to be based upon
constructive service, the legislature must provide necessary procedural safe-
guards under fourteenth amendment due process; the matter of procedural
safeguards cannot be chanced haphazardly to the circumstances of each par-
ticular case.
70. Id. at 313.
71. Id. at 314-15.
72. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
73. Id. at 18, 24.
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B. The Trend of Recent State and Federal Court Cases
To take advantage of the enlarged personal jurisdiction permitted by
the minimvum contac~ts test, and meet the required statutory-specification
of procedural safeguards, as per Wclkter -u. Pizzutti, a wave of state legis-
lation has appeared. The earlier statutes were formulated to authorize con-
structive service on a power-basis of "implied consent." Widespread en-
actment of nonresident motorist statutes followed this pattern.7 4 There
were also statutes deeming special appearances a general appearance for
practical purposes" and procedural provisions making possible out-of-state
service upon local domiciliaries in certain situations.7 6 After International
Skoe, the statutory emphasis shifted to ground jurisdiction upon local (or
locally consummated) activity. Some of the most recent statutes, of various
types, have enlarged personal jurisdiction to new extremes. Those of Il-
linois,17 Vermont,7 8 North Carolina,7 9 Wisconsin,18 and Montana,81 and
74. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 9-301 (1963); § 506.210, RSMo 1959. Cf.
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) and the Massachusetts statute involved;
Gibbons, A Survey of the Modern Nonresident Motorist Statutes, 13 U. FLA. L.
REv. 257 (1960); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39 Htav. L. REV.
563 (1926).
75. E.g., the Texas statute involved in York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
76. E.g., the Wyoming statutes involved in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1940); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 232-233 (1942). Cf. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW AND
RULES § 313 (1963).
77. ILL. CIV. PRAc. Acr 3§ 16-17; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16-17 (1963),
quoted infra, note 93. Statutes in the Illinois pattern have been enacted in New
York, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW AND RULES: § 302 (1963); Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 4.28.180-.185 (1962); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 5-514, 515 (1963 Supp.);
and Kansas, KAN. SEss. LAws 1963, ch. 303, § 60-308. Regarding the Washington
statute, see Comment, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents-The Washkington "Long
Arn" Statute, 38 WASH. L. REv. 560 (1963). Regarding the Kansas statute, see
Jacobson, The Enlargement of Jurisdiction Over Unlicensed Foreign Corporations
Comnitting Torts in Kansas: New Code 60-308, 12 KAN. L. REv. 49 (1963).
78. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 855-56 (1959). Statutes in the Vermont pattern
have been enacted in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 47.16 (1962 Supp.); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (1)(3) (1962 Supp.) and Missouri, § 351.630, RSMo
1961 Supp.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-144, 145, 146 (1960), quoted infra note 107. A
statute in the North Carolina pattern has been enacted in Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411 (1960).
80. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (1963 Supp.).
81. MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2702-2 (Rule 4) (B) (1963):
(1) Subject to Jurisdiction. All persons found within the state of Mon-
tana are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. In addition,
any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
claim for relief arising from the doing personally, through an employee, or
through an agent, of any of the following acts:
(a) the transaction of any business within this state;
(b) the commission of any act which results in accrual within this
state of a tort action;
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a court rule in New Jersey8 2 are examples.83 Some apply to all outsiders,
others only to foreign corporations. All are attempts to protect local plain-
tiffs within the permissible extent of jurisdiction as announced in the lead-
ing Supreme Court cases.
The Supreme Court to date has not passed upon the constitutionality
of any of these recent statutes. One case currently before the Court, 4
arising from Alabama which has typical older-type statutes and rules pro-
viding for local constructive service in the "doing business" situation,"5
presents issues bearing upon their constitutionality. The case, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan (Ala. 1962), involves a libel action by a member
of the Board of Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, who also served
(c) the ownership, use, or possession of any property, or of any in-
terest therein, situated within this state;
(d) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located with-
in this state at the time of contracting;
(e) entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for ma-
terials to be furnished in this state by such person; or
(f) acting as director, manager, trustee, or other officer of any corpora-
tion organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business
within, this state, or ,as executor or administrator of any estate within this
state.
(2) Acquisition of Jurisdiction. Jurisdiction may be acquired by our
courts over any person through service of process as herein provided; ...
[detailed methods of constructive service are set out].
A statute in the Montana pattern has been enacted in Michigan, Micr. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.701-741 (1962). No reported cases arising under either the Montana
or Michigan statute have been found. Cf. Briggs, Contemporary Problems in Con-
flict of Laws-Jurisdiction by Statute, Part II, 24 MoNT. L. REv. 85 (1963); Towe,
Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents and Montana's New Rule 4B, 24 MoNT.
L. REv. 3 (1962).
82. N.J.R.R. 4:4-4(d) which provides for out-of-state service upon a foreign
corporation "subject to due process of law, by mailing, registered mail return re-
ceipt requested, a copy of the summons and complaint to a registered agent for
service, or to its principal place of business, or to its registered office." (Emphasis
added.) There may be some doubt as to whether a court rule, rather than a
statute, meets the requirements of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, text at notes 72-73, supra.
83. Cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92 (1957); Stimson, Omnibus Statutes De-
signed to Secure Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Defendants, 48 A.B.A.J. 725 (1962).
84. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So.2d 25 (1962), cert.
granted 371 U.S. 946 (1963).
85. ALA. CODE tit. 7, Rule 5(2e) (1958): "... Wherever a foreign corporation
has carried on or transacted business in this state without qualifying to do busi-
ness herein as is provided by the Constitution and statutes of this state, and there
is no other agent, and process cannot be served on such foreign corporation as
above provided in this rule [upon a designated agent], then any legal process may
be served upon any agent or servant of such foreign corporation who has made
contracts for the corporation or who did the act which constituted the doing of
business in this state. . . " There was also a statute providing for service upon the
Secretary of State in this situation, Alabama Acts Reg. Sess. 1953, at 347; ALA.
CoDE tit. 7, § 199(1) (1958).
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as Police Commissioner, against The New York Times and others, based
upon the publication in its New York newspaper of an advertisement, con-
taining allegedly false and defamatory material about the plaintiff, sub-
mitted by the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the Struggle
for Freedom in the South." One of the methods of service of process em-
ployed was upon one Dan McKee, a "stringer" ' , in Montgomery who passed
news stories on to The New York Times and other newspapers. The Times
had a regular staff correspondent in Atlanta, Georgia, who covered eleven
states including Alabama. The Times' staff correspondents spent 153 days in
Alabama from 1956 until 1960, and gathered 49 news articles there during
that time. It sought advertising in Alabama by "sales" solicitors, receiving
$26,800 worth from 1956 until 1960, and regularly dispatched 390 daily
newspapers and 2,500 Sunday editions into Alabama, most of them going
to local dealers-who were given credit for unsold papers, damages in
transit, etc. Beyond this, The Times conducted no business in Alabama.
The Alabama Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction declaring that under
recent decisions, "the activities of The New York Times, .. .are amply
sufficient to more than meet the minimal standards required for service
upon its representative McKee."87 The court thought McKee a sufficient
agent of The Times for purposes of service providing adequate notice,
and "[j]ustice demands that Alabama be permitted to protect its citizens
from tortious libels, the effects of such libels certainly occurring to a sub-
stantial degree in the State.""" The court concluded that the publishing
of advertisements, in which the alleged libelous matter appeared, was a
substantial part of The Times' business, and when it called upon "stringer"
McKee to investigate the truth of the published advertisement, "specific
acts directly connected with, and directly incident to the business of The
Times" were committed in Alabama giving rise to the cause of action.,9
There were other federal constitutional issues in the case, and what the
86. "A 'stringer' is usually employed by another newspaper, or news agency
and is called upon for stories occasionally, or offers stories upon his own. A
'stringer' is paid at about the rate of a penny a word. No deductions are made
from these payments for such things as income tax, social security, insurance con-
tributions, etc., and 'stringers' are not carried on the payroll of The Times. Up to
July 26 for the year 1960, The Times had paid Chadwick, the 'stringer' in Birming-
ham, $135.00 for stories accepted, and paid McKee $90.00." 273 Ala. at 665, 144
So.2d at 29.
87. Supra note 84 at 669, 144 So.2d at 33. Contra, New York Times Co. v.
Conner, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961).
88. Ibid.
89. Id. at 671, 144 So.2d at 35.
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United States Supreme Court will do with the jurisdiction issue remains to
be seen. The miinimwm contacts test was probably met: there was regular
and systematic activity of a sort in Alabama and arguably, at least, the
cause of action arose there.
State and federal courts have gone far with these new statutes. Retro-
active application has posed no real problem;90 the statutes are remedial
and neither enlarge nor impair substantive rights and obligations-"there
is no vested right in any particular remedy or method of procedure." 9'
"Retrospective application of such a statute creates a problem only if
that application operates unfairly against a litigant who justifiably acted
in reliance on some provision of the prior law. . . [which] is difficult to
imagine . . ." in this kind of case.92
The Illinois statute,93 enacted in 1955, authorizes personal jurisdiction
over outsiders, individual or corporate, for the "transaction of any business"
90. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); accord, McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Owens v. Superior Court, 52
Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959); cf. Comment, Retroactive Expansion of State
Court Jurisdiction Over Persons, 63 COL. L. REv. 1105 (1963). Contra, Nevins v.
Revlon, Inc., 23 Conn. Sup. 314, 182 A.2d 634 (1962); Davis v. Jones, 247 Iowa
1031, 78 N.W.2d 6 (1956).
91. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 382, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676; accord, Owens
v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 822, 833, 345 P.2d 921, 926 (1959): "There is no merit
in defendant's contention that subdivision (b) is inapplicable on the ground that
it was enacted after the action was filed and he had established his domicile in
Arizona. . . The statute governs procedure only, for it neither creates a new
cause of action nor deprives defendant of any defense on the merits, and defend-
ant has no vested right to have the jurisdiction of the courts of this state limited
as it was at the time he left the state . C." f. McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957).
92. Nelson v. Miller, Id. at 383, 143 N.E.2d at 676.
93. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16-17 (1963):t
§ 16. Personal service outside State. (1) Personal service of summons
may be made upon any party outside the State. If upon a citizen or res-
ident of this State or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State, it shall have the force and effect of personal
service of summons within this State; otherwise it shall have the force and
effect of service by publication. ...
§ 17. Act su6mitting to jurisdiction-Process. (1) Any person, whether
or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent
does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person,
and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any
of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in
this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within
this State at the time of contracting.
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or the "commission of a tortious act" within the state. Nelson v. Miller
(Ill. 1957) 94 promptly upheld the constitutionality of the statute and ap-
plied it to ground jurisdiction over a nonresident individual Wisconsin ap-
pliance dealer whose delivery man while in Illinois, pushed a stove so as
to sever one of the plaintiff's fingers and injure another. Helriegel v. Sears
Roebuck & Co. (N.D. Ill. 1957), 5 denying jurisdiction over an Ohio manu-
facturer, held the statute inapplicable in the case of a local plaintiff's injury
by a power mower in Illinois purchased from an independent local retailer,
the mower having been manufactured and sold, allegedly as a dangerous
article without adequate warning, to the retailer in Ohio by the defendant.
There was reluctance to exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents who tor-
tiously manufactured goods outside the state, subsequently sold to the plain-
tiff by third persons within the state. Grobark v. Addo Machine Co. (Ill.
1959)0 6 denied jurisdiction over a New York manufacturer selling adding
machines in New York to the plaintiff for resale in Chicago as exclusive
dealer. The case involved a suit for wrongful cancellation of the plaintiff's
exclusive dealership entered into, to be performed, and allegedly breached
in Illinois, rather than for a tort, but the rationale was the same: reluc-
tance to exercise jurisdiction when the defendant's conduct (business-sales)
took place outside the state. But this reluctance was short-lived, at least
in the tort situation. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.
(Il1. 1961 )07 held an Ohio valve manufacturer subject to local jurisdiction
in a suit by an Illinois consumer, injured in Illinois by an exploding water
heater purchased there from a retailer who had obtained the water heater
from its Pennsylvania manufacturer, the alleged defective valve having
been affixed to the heater in Pennsylvania. There was no evidence the Ohio
valve manufacturer had done any business on its own in Illinois, though
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the juris-
diction of the courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be made
by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State,
as provided in this Act, with the same force and effect as though summons
had been personally served within this State.(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is
based upon this section....
Cf. Cleary and Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50
N.W.U. L. REv. 599-611 (1955).
94. 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
95. 157 F.Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
96. 16 Ill.2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959). Accord, Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer
Gifts, Inc., 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
97. 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
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the court observed that its valves may have appeared on a number of
products sold in Illinois. The tort was said to have been committed in
Illinois because the consequences occurred there and "in law the place of
a wrong is where the last event takes place which is necessary to render
the actor liable."918 The minimum contacts test, as established by Interna-
tional Shoe, was thought satisfied "if the act or transaction itself has a
substantial connection with the State of the forum."9 The Ohio defendant
"enjoys benefits from the laws of this State, and it has undoubtedly benefited,
to a degree, from the protection which our law has given to the marketing
of hot water heaters containing its valves."'10 0 The court added that "if a
corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it
is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects
in those products."'"'
Vermont's statute0 2 authorizes constructive service upon foreign cor-
porations committing "a tort in whole or in part in Vermont against a
resident of Vermont." Smytk v. Twin State Improvement Corp. (Vt.
1951) 103 ruled jurisdiction could be exercised over a Massachusetts building
and roofing company which had left holes in the plaintiff's house in Rutland,
Vermont, while endeavoring to re-roof it and affix new siding, causing sub-
sequent damage by leaking rain water. Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Co.
(2d Cir. 1963),104 brought in the federal court for Vermont, reached a re-
sult like the Illinois Gray case. Plaintiff was seriously injured in Vermont by
a gas explosion occurring when she attempted to relight the pilot on her
aunt's Rheem water heater, which operated with a built-in control device
manufactured by Robertshaw Fulton Controls Co. Both defendants Rheem
and Robertshaw were foreign corporations, and neither had legally qualified
to do business in Vermont. Jurisdiction was sustained on the ground that
the defendants had committed acts knowing they might have potential
consequences in Vermont. Rheem water heaters, with Robertshaw controls,
were regularly shipped to Rheem's franchised wholesaler for northwestern
98. Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63.
99. Id. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
100. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
101. Ibid. A result similar to Gray was reached in Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960) applying MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 303.13(1) (3) (1962 Supp.). Minnesota too had its earlier decision comparable
to Helriegel: Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F.Supp. 416 (D.Minn. 1959).
102. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 855-6 (1959).
103. 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
104. 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963). Accord, Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Con-
trols Co., 204 F.Supp. 117, 29 F.R.D. 490 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
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Vermont and resold to retailers in that area, from one of which the water
heater involved had been purchased. Rheem distributed promotional and
service information to these retailers, and representatives of Robertshaw
made "calls" on them, giving instructions in the operation of the controls.
The court thought the tort "obviously committed in Vermont," and that
"holding these defendants responsible to Vermont law comports well with
the notions of due process enunciated by the Supreme Court in McGee and
Hanson!"" Arrowsmitk v. United Press International (2d Cir. 1963),106
also brought in the federal court for Vermont, held, though the issue was
not squarely presented, that under Vermont law UPI, a New York corpora-
tion, might well be subjected to jurisdiction in Vermont courts in a libel
suit by a Maryland resident, when UPI had dispatched the alleged libelous
matter to its eleven subscribers in Vermont (two newspapers, eight radio
stations, and one radio-television station) and had one employee in Ver-
mont (the "manager" of its Montpelier "News Bureau"-upon whom serv-
ice was made-who occupied desk space in the state house and "punched
out" Vermont news). Though the Vermont statute did not apply since the
plaintiff was not a Vermont resident, the court thought the statute indi-
cated a policy of expanded jurisdiction and a Vermont court might fill
the gap to assert jurisdiction under its common law, as shown in older
Vermont cases, and expressly declined to rule that jurisdiction would violate
due process on the facts presented.
The North Carolina statute, an interesting one to show the extent to
which local legislators will go,107 provides for jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations
105. Id. at 128.
106. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-144, 145, 146 (1960) [enacted in 1955]:
§ 55-144. Suits against foreign corporations transacting business in the
State without authorization.-Whenever a foreign corporation shall trans-
act business in this State without first procuring a certificate of authority
so to do from the Secretary of State ... then the Secretary of State shall
be an agent of such corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand
in any suit upon a cause of action arising out of such business may be
served.
§ 55-145. Jurisdiction over foreign corporations not transacting busi-
ness in this State.-(a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit
in this State, by a resident of this State or by a person having a usual place
of business in this State, whether or not such foreign corporation is trans-
acting or has transacted business in this State and whether or not it is en-
gaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action
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whether or not transacting.. business in this state . . - on
any cause of action arising... (3) Out of the production, manu-
facture, or distribution of goods by such corporation with the
reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed
in this State and are so used and consumed, . (4) Out of tort-
ious conduct in this State, ...
Erlanger Mills v. Cokoes Fibre Mills (4th Cir. 1956)108 involved an action
in a federal court for North Carolina against a New York corporation for
defective goods sold to a North Carolina plaintiff, f.o.b. Cohoes, New York,
the plaintiff having placed a special order with the defendant at its New
(2) Out of any business solicited in this State by mail or otherwise if
the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or
offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the State; or
(3) Out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by
such corporation with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to
be used or consumed in this State and are so used or consumed, regardless
of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed, or sold
or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or
dealers; or
(4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of re-
peated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or
nonfeasance.(b) Whenever a foreign parent corporation is subject to liability for
any obligations of a subsidiary corporation that is subject to suit in this
State, the parent corporation is itself so subject in any action to enforce
the said liability. : . .
(c) Any foreign corporation subject to suit under this section may,
even though it is not transacting business in this State, appoint and main-
tain a registered agent, . . . In any case where a foreign corporation is sub-ject to suit under this section and has failed to appoint and maintain a
registered agent upon whom process might be served, or whenever such
registered agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found . . . then the
Secretary of State shall be an agent of such corporation upon whom any
process in any such cause of action may be served.
§ 55-146. Service on foreign corporations by service on Secretary of
State.-(a) Service on the Secretary of State, when he is agent of a foreign
corporation as provided in this chapter, . . . shall be made by the sheriff
delivering to and leaving with the Secretary of State duplicate copies of
such process, . . . Service of process on the foreign corporation shall be
deemed complete when the Secretary of State is so served. The Secretary
of State shall endorse upon both copies the time of receipt and shall forth-
with send one of such copies by registered mail with return receipt re-
quested addressed to such corporation at its principal office as it appears in
the records of the Secretary of State or, if there is no address of the
corporation on file with the Secretary of State, then to said corporation at
its office as shown in the official registry of the state of its incorporation.
The Secretary of State may require the plaintiff or his attorney to furnish
such address ....
(c) Service made under this section shall have the same legal force-
and validity as if the service had been made personally in this State. . ..
108. 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
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York offices, and the defendant having specially manufactured the goods
to fill the order. There was no evidence the defendant had done any busi-
ness in North Carolina or dealt with any other North Carolinian. Denying
jurisdiction, the court of appeals held the statute unconstitutional as sought
to be applied to the facts of the case. The minim'um contacts test was not
met: the New York defendant had no "definite link" with North Carolina.
Further facts that the contract price was sizeable ($17,000) and the de-
fendant's general manager had visited the plaintiff's offices in North Car-
olina to discuss the claim-where he was handed the process summons-
also failed to impress the court as sufficient contacts. Moreover, the court
thought this kind of jurisdiction would involve an undue burden upon inter-
state commerce, giving a colorful example of "the hesitancy a California
dealer might feel if asked to sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania
license plates, knowing that he might be required to defend in the courts
of Pennsylvania a suit for refund of the purchase price or for heavy dam-
ages in case of accident attributed to a defect in the tires"-such a sale
also being "with the reasonable expectation that these goods are to be used
or consumed in [the vendee's domicile] and are so used and consumed." 10 9
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc. (N.C. 1957)110 similarly held the
statute's "reasonable expectation" clause unconstitutional, under the nlin-
itmum contacts test, as sought to be applied in a libel and invasion of pri-
vacy suit by North Carolinian Harley Putnam against the Delaware pub-
lisher of the magazine "Official Detective Stories" and others, sold on news-
stands in North Carolina. The defendant Delaware publisher sold its mag-
azines in mass lots to eighteen independent North Carolina wholesalers
who took delivery from defendant outside North Carolina with a return-
privilege for unsold copies and resold to retailers in the state; it solicited
neither subscriptions nor advertising in North Carolina, though a few times
a year, one of its representatives visited the state to obtain statistics and
promote sales.
But the North Carolina legislature declined to alter the statute. In
Painter v. Home Finance Company (N.C. 1957),111 a South Carolina cor-
poration, alleged to have wrongfully repossessed Mrs. Myrtle Painter's 1952
Dodge in Buncombe County, North Carolina and taken it to South Carolina
where it was sold, was held subject to jurisdiction under the statute's
109. Id. at 507.
110. 245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
111. 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957).
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"tortious conduct in this State" clause. When this emotion-provoking
case came along, with actual conduct by the defendant in the state, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in a short opinion, citing Vermont's
Smyth case and International Shoe, could hardly wait to apply the statute.
Shepard v. Rkeem, Manaufacturing Co. (N.C. 1959),112 another exploding
water heater personal injury, emotion-provoking case, then sustained jur-
isdiction under the statute's "reasonable expectation"' clause, in an action
by North Carolinian Mrs. Kathryn Shepard against a foreign corporation,
where the defendant, as in the Vermont Rkeem case, had shipped large quan-
tities of its water heaters into North Carolina for sale by dealers there.
The court thought the "acts of negligence upon which the plaintiff bases
her cause were committed" by the defendant in its "manufacturing and pro-
ducing a defective gas water heater and in causing it to be shipped into
this State where it was installed and used in the plaintiff's home . . . in-
flicting upon her serious personal injury.".13 The holding was believed to
be entirely consistent with the minimum contacts test of the International
Shoe case, and "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
The Erlanger Mills and Putnam. cases were disregarded as being distinguish-
able on their facts. Belk v. Belk's Department Store (N.C. 1959)114 upheld
jurisdiction over a closely-held South Carolina department store corpora-
tion in an action by a Florida resident stockholder to compel declaration of
a cash dividend by the corporation, which operated no stores in North Car-
olina but regularly purchased substantial quantities of merchandise there
and held stockholders' and directors' meetings and had its executive of-
fices at Charlotte in that state. The court found sufficient minimum contacts
on which to base jurisdiction and did not even refer to the jurisdiction-
enlarging statute. Moss v. City of Winston-Salem (N.C. 1961), 111 however,
denied jurisdiction, under the statute's "reasonable expectation" and
"tortious conduct in this State" clauses, in a personal injury suit on behalf
of a ten-year-old North Carolina boy against defendant foreign corporation
for the manufacture and sale of a power mower, allegedly without adequate
warning of the danger in operating it without a screen to protect against
solid objects being picked up out of the grass and ejected with great force,
which caused the plaintiff's injuries. The particular mower had been pur-
chased by the City of Winston-Salem on a bid from a local farm tractor
112. 249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959).
113. Id. at 460, 106 S.E.2d at 708.
114. 250 N.C. 99, 108 S.E.2d 131 (1959).
115. 254 N.C. 480, 119 S.E.2d 445 (1961).
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company which had obtained it from a Norfolk, Virginia independent dis-
tributor. The defendant manufacturer had nothing whatever to do with
the transaction and did no business in North Carolina. Following its Putnm
case, with no mention of Shepard v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., the North
Carolina court held that since the defendant had "no contacts, ties, or re-
lations with the State of North Carolina" jurisdiction could not be main-
tained. 26
These cases indicate the broad jurisdiction-enlarging North Carolina
statute has not had easy going in the courts. In the emotion-provoking
wrongfully-repossessed automobile and exploding water heater cases, the
North Carolina court showed little hesitancy in its application, but other-
wise, jurisdiction based on the statute has been carefully avoided (the
Moss case was not nearly so emotion-provoking by reason of the strained
"failure to warn" basis for the tort). The Putnam and Moss cases cannot
be distinguished in principle from the Rheem exploding water heater case,
as far as the defendant foreign corporation's contacts with North Carolina
are concerned, and that is the ground on which the court purported to base
its distinctions. The Moss case can be distinguished from Rheem, in that
the power mower manufacturer probably had no "reasonable expectation"
within the meaning of the statute that its power mower would be "used
or consumed" in North Carolina, while the water heater manufacturer did,
when it shipped them in large quantities into the state for sale by dealers
there. But no such distinction was made by the North Carolina court, and
the Putnam case certainly could not be distinguished on that basis since
the defendant Delaware publisher produced and distributed great numbers
of magazines specifically destined for North Carolina. The conclusion is
inescapable that the North Carolina court wants to pick and choose among
cases to be tried there, and is using the minimum contacts test in order to
do so.
New Jersey's rule of procedure provides for constructive service by
registered mail upon a foreign corporation "subject to due process of law." 117
Hoagland v. Springer (N.J. Super. 1962)118 sustained jurisdiction over a
Michigan corporation, constructively served in accordance with the rule,
by reason of the "economic realities" of the situation. Plaintiff's employer,
a New Jersey trucker, had purchased a Cummins engine for one of his
116. Id. at 484, 119 S.E.2d at 447-48.
117. See note 82 supra.
118. 75 N.J. Super. 560, 183 A.2d 678 (App. Div. 1962), aff'd pTer curiam 39
N.J. 32, 186 A.2d 679 (1962).
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truck tractors from the defendant, receiving and installing it in Dearborn,
Michigan; the engine subsequently exploded while plaintiff was driving the
tractor on the New Jersey Turnpike seriously injuring him. The Michigan
defendant was a Cummins distributor for its area, doing no business in New
Jersey; another Cummins distributor held the New Jersey territory, had
legally qualified to, and did conduct business there. The defendant Mich-
igan distributor and the New Jersey distributor assisted each other in the
service of Cummins engines, regardless where or by whom sold, and dealt
with each other in the sale of parts and materials. The court thought Cum-
mins, an Indiana corporation, and all its distributors formed one cohesive
economic unit, and the Cummins operation in New Jersey sufficient local
activity upon which to ground jurisdiction over the Michigan distributor;
otherwise, the Michigan distributor would be permitted "to receive the
fruits of its New Jersey activities without the attendant liabilities which
should go with it."119
In some recent cases, enlarged personal jurisdiction has been exercised
using older-type general service statutes. The Alabama Supreme Court up-
held jurisdiction over The New York Times in this manner in New York
Times Co. v. SUllivan.12O In Sanders Associates, Inc. v. Galion Iron Works
& Mfg. Co. (lst Cir. 1962), 121 a breach of contract suit brought in the
federal court for New Hampshire by Sanders, a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in New Hampshire, against Galion, an Ohio
corporation which bad never legally qualified in New Hampshire, the only
New Hampshire statute applicable was a typical one providing for con-
structive service upon the Secretary of State in the "doing business" situa-
tion.122 The contract had required as Sanders' performance, the manufac-
ture of certain models of a newly-developed motor grader attachment in
New Hampshire, and Galion's representatives consulted with Sanders on
several occasions there regarding this project. Galion sold its motor graders
119. Id. at 570, 183 A.2d at 684.
120. Text at notes 84-89 supra.
121. 304 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1962).
122. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN., ch. 300 § 11 (1955): "Service of process .. .on a
foreign corporation, may be made... Whenever any foreign corporation authorized
to transact, or transacting business in this state shall fail to appoint or maintain
in this state a registered agent upon whom service of legal process ...may be
had, or whenever service on any such registered agent cannot with reasonable
diligence and promptness be made .. .then and in every such case the secretary
of state shall be and hereby is irrevocably authorized as the agent and representa-
tive of such foreign corporation to accept service of any process . . . required or
permitted by law to be served upon such corporation."
1963]
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss3/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
and road rollers in New Hampshire, primarily through a local independent
distributor, controlling most of the incidents of all such sales. The contract
sued upon had no relation with this distributorship or Galion's local sales,
and the district court had denied jurisdiction for that reason. 23 The court
of appeals reversed, holding jurisdiction could be exercised on the ground
that Galion was engaged in the "mainstream" of commercial business in
New Hampshire sufficient under the minimum contacts test, equating the
local independent distributorship to a Galion branch outlet by reason of the
control Galion had over sales made by the distributor, and it made no dif-
ference whether the cause of action in suit was related or unrelated to that
"mainstream." Though recognizing that New Hampshire law determined
whether jurisdiction will be exercisedl 2 4 the court had no trouble finding
jurisdiction under the New Hampshire older-type constructive service
statute declaring, with little discussion and rarely-displayed aplomb, "that
it was the objective of the local statute to exercise jurisdiction to the full
extent of the constitutional limit.''1 2 5 Shealy v. Challenger Manufacturing Co.
(4th Cir. 1962),12 1 a personal injury suit by South Carolinian Shealy against
Tennessee corporation Challenger brought in the federal court for western
South Carolina, upheld local personal jurisdiction, where Challenger regularly
shipped or delivered and sold quantities of its disappearing stairways to an
independent building supply wholesaler in South Carolina for resale. Shealy
alleged injuries caused by a defect in one of Challenger's stairways which
had been purchased from the independent wholesaler in South Carolina
by a building contractor and installed in a new residence constructed for
Shealy there. The court found sufficient minimum contacts with South Car-
olina, by reason of Challenger's locally consummated activity, to remove
any "substantial constitutional question,"'1 27 the case being "far from the
penumbra bordering the outer constitutional limits,' 28 but was troubled
123. 203 F.Supp. 522 (D.N.H. 1961).
124. Quoting from Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194
(1st Cir. 1948), see text at note 22 supra.
125. 304 F.2d at 919, citing W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Nuodex Products Co.,
243 F.2d 116, 123-24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957) [particularly,
Woodbury, C.J. (concurring)]. Compare Benson v. Brattleboro Retreat, 103 N.H.
28, 164 A.2d 560 (1960).
126. 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962). [The opinion is authored by Haynsworth,
C.J.; it is interesting to note that Sobeloff, Ch.J., author of the opinion in Erlanger
Mi/ls, see text at notes 108-09 supra, also heard this case and apparently joined in
the Haynsworth opinion. Accord, Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204
F.Supp. 117, 29 F.R.D. 490 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
127. Id. at 103-04.
128. Id. at 107.
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with the interpretation of an older-type South Carolina constructive serv-
ice statute, which it did not bother to quote,'2 9 the only applicable South
Carolina statute-which the court thus recognized was binding in the
case. There were pre-International Shoe South Carolina cases denying jur-
isdiction in similar factual situations, but these were discarded. Pointing
out that International Shoe had been law for more than 16 years, the
court thought "the law has moved on in the state courts as it has in the
federal," that "the more recent decisions illuminate the old" ones, and
"when a state's interpretation of her service of process statute has already
moved forward in keeping with the relaxation of earlier declarations of
constitutional restraint upon her power [as South Carolina's had done to
some extent], there is no longer a place for hesitancy to assume that it
will" move on with the trend.3'° The earlier South Carolina decisions were
believed to have been forced upon the South Carolina courts by restricted
notions of jurisdiction prevailing at the time, 31 and the court thought
South Carolina courts today would uphold jurisdiction in this kind of
case, without any legislative enlargement.
In other cases, enlarged personal jurisdiction has been exercised by
sideways application of related jurisdiction-enlarging statutes. Owens v.
Superior Court (Cal. 1959) 1"2 upheld local jurisdiction over an Arizonan
whose dog bit the plaintiff in Los Angeles, California. At the time of the
bite, defendant resided in California and was domiciled there, but, prior
to filing of the suit, had moved to Arizona and become domiciled there.
A California statute provided for jurisdiction over an outsider who "was
a resident of this State (a) at the time of the commencement of the
action, or (b) at the time that the cause of action arose, or (c) at the
129. S.C. CODE §§ 12-722, 10-424 (1962). These provide for service upon "the
Secretary of State ... in any action ... against such foreign corporation growing
out of the transaction of any business in this State," and "Such service may also
be made by delivery of a copy thereof to any such corporation outside the
State, . . ." § 12-722 was repealed in 1962, effective January 1, 1964, and superseded
by § 13.14 of Act No. 847 (1962) as part the new South Carolina Business Corpora-
tion Act of 1962, which provides for equivalent constructive service. S.C. Acts at
2118-9 (1962).
130. 304 F.2d at 105.
131. "Our conclusion is emphasized by the fact that when South Carolina's
Supreme Court in earlier cases found substantial activity in that state insufficient
to support an assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, that court in-
variably declared that its conclusion was governed by federal authorities. Plainly,
it then construed the reach of the statutes to be not less wide than the constitu-
tional limitations as they were then understood... ." Id. at 107.
132. 52 Cal.2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959).
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time of service."' 3 Defendant having been personally served in Arizona,
the only basis for jurisdiction under the statute was the fact that he had
been a resident domiciled in California at the time the cause of action
arose. A number of earlier California cases had sustained jurisdiction over
defendants who were domiciled in California at the time the cause of
action arose and at the time of the commencement of the suit even though
served outside the state.134 The Supreme Court of California was reluctant
to ground jurisdiction solely upon defendant's California residence and
domicile at the time the cause of action arose, but ruled that since "the
cause of action arose out of defendant's activities in this state, namely,
his ownership and possession of the offending dog" as a California dom-
iciliary, the minimm contacts test was satisfied. 35 Such local activity by
a California domiciliary giving rise to the cause of acton was sufficient.
Pugh, v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (E.D. La. 1958) 13G
exercised personal jurisdiction over an Oklahoma insurance company,
which had done no business in Louisiana and had not legally qualified
there, simply by reason of its automobile liability policy issued to an
Oklahoma resident who drove his automobile into Louisiana and injured
plaintiff, a Texan and passenger in the automobile. Louisiana had expressly
extended the application of her nonresident motorist statute to public
liability and property damage insurers of the vehicles of nonresident
motorists 37 and had a "direct action" statute subjecting insurance com-
panies to suit prior to the injured party's determination of rights against
the insured. 38 The "minimal" contact with Louisiana--"presence on the
irisk at the time of the accident"-was held sufficient to ground jurisdiction
under the McGee case.13
The preceding state and federal court cases were selected as presenting
difficult close questions and striking highlights in recent efforts to exercise
jurisdiction. No attempt was made at a thorough coverage of the law.
The picture was merely representative of the movement, both statutory
133. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 417 (1963 Supp.).
134. Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal.2d 235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955); Myrick v. Superior
Court, 41 Cal.2d 519, 261 P.2d 255 (1953); Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.2d
306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953).
135. Supra note 132 at 830-32, 345 P.2d at 924-25.
136. 159 F.Supp. 155 (E.D. La. 1958).
137. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3474 (Supp. 1962).
138. LA. REv. STAT. § 22:655 (Supp. 1962), upheld against constitutional ob-
jections in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
139. Supra note 136 at 158-59.
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and in the courts, since Internutional Shoe. A clear trend appears: legisla-
tures and courts are teaming up to exercise ever-broadening personal
jurisdiction over outsiders, in what resembles a frenzy to aid local in-
terests. The legislatures and courts hardly keep up with each other;
in North Carolina, for instance, the legislature has gone considerably fur-
ther than the courts,140 whereas in Illinois,'-' Vermont,1 42 New Hamp-
shire,14 3 South Carolina, 14  and California,' 5 the courts appear to have
gone further than the legislature.
Broad interpretations of these cases, each involving its special fact
situation and application of local statutes, would be meaningless and will
not be attempted here, but certain features of the trend do stand out. The
forum court's attitude or disposition toward the exercise of jurisdiction
appears more important than the presence, absence, or specific provisions
of applicable jurisdiction-enlarging statutes. A comparison of the Illinois
Gray,'" Vermont RheeM,147 and North Carolina Rheem'o" water heater
explosion cases with the South Carolina Challenger defective disappearing
stairway case' 49 demonstrates this. North Carolina had the broadest statute
with its "reasonable expectation" clause, Illinois and Vermont had statutes
covering torts committed in the state, and South Carolina had only an
older-type general service statute, yet each court found jurisdiction on
similar facts, a wrong committed outside the forum state with personal
injury consequences within. In the New Hampshire Galion breach of con-
tract case, 50 the federal court seemed bent on exercising jurisdiction re-
gardless of the statute. Statutes like those in Illinois, Vermont, and North
Carolina authorizing personal jurisdiction on narrow particularized bases,
"single acts" so-called, point the way for courts to exercise jurisdiction
over outsiders more readily than otherwise. Certainly, such statutes estab-
lish an obvious minimum basis for personal jurisdiction. But the absence
of such a statute did not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction in the Cali-
140. See text at notes 107-16 supra.
141. See text at notes 93-101 supra.
142. See text at notes 102-06 supra.
143. See text at notes 121-25 supra.
144. See text at notes 126-31 supra.
145. See text at notes 132-35 supra.
146. See text at notes 97-101 supra.
147. See text at notes 104-05 supra.
148. See text at notes 112-13 supra.
149. See text at notes 126-31 supra.
150. See text at notes 121-25 supra.
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fornia Owens dog bite case, 51 the Alabama New York Times libel case,""
or the South Carolina Challenger defective disappearing stairway case. And
presence of the broadest of these statutes did not lead to the exercise of
jurisdiction in the North Carolina Putnam "Official Detective Stories"
libel case,15 3 though there may have been special public overtones, and
thus a greater forum interest, in the Alabama New York Times case.
The flexible minimum contacts test has opened the door, and state
and federal courts have gone a long way with it. The "mere solicitation"'
rule, as announced in Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., none-
theless, still stands.' " Even under the recent statutes, it has weathered the
storm; 5 some local (or locally consummated) activity creating a real
interest in the forum state is required, and solicitation alone hardly does
so. "Traditional notions of fair play" in American law still generally permit
outsiders to solicit local business without undue consequence.
III. THE PRESENT MISSOURI LAW OF PERSONAI JURISDICTION
The present setup of Missouri statutes is favorable for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. Missouri has typical constructive service statutes
permitting local personal jurisdiction over the following: foreign corpora-
tions legally qualified to do business in the state; 56 foreign savings and
loan associations;' 5 7 authorized and unauthorized foreign insurance com-
panies; 1 foreign fraternal benefit societies; 159 foreign mutual insurance
151. See text at notes 132-35 supra.
152. See text at notes 84-89 supra.
153. See text at note 110 supra.
154. L. D. Reeder Contractors v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.
1959); MacInnes v. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp., 257 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1958);
Fannin v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 204 F.Supp. 154 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Fisher
Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 221, 347 P.2d 1 (1959); Miller v. Surf
Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958); cf. Walt-
ham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.
1962).
155. See Southern New England Distrib. Corp. v. Berkeley Fin. Corp., 30
F.R.D. 43 (D.Conn. 1962), Connecticut Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Bowsteel Distrib., 24
Conn.Sup. 290, 190 A.2d 236 (1963), Dumas v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 253 N.C.
501, 117 S.E.2d 426 (1960), all requiring something in addition to "mere solicita-
tion." The broad North Carolina statute does not purport to ground jurisdiction
upon solicitation alone-limiting its application to "any cause of action arising
... out of any business solicited in this State by mail or otherwise if the corpora-
tion has repeatedly so solicited business. ... ."-See note 107 supra.
156. §§ 351.580, .620, RSMo 1959; §§ 351.630(1), (3)-(5), 355.375(1), (3)-
(5), RSMo 1961 Supp.; Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.06 (c).
157. § 369.580, RSMo 1959; Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.21.
158. §§ 375.160-.162, .210, .220, .820, RSMo 1959; Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.20.
159. §§ 378.400-.410, RSMo 1959; Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.20.
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companies;160 nonresident securities issuers;'" foreign banking corpora-
tions; 162 foreign corporate fiduciaries; 6 3 adjacent-state rural electric coopera-
tives;164 nonresident milk manufacturers and processors;165 nonresident
motor carriers; 66 nonresident motorists;167 and nonresident watercraft
owners.' -68 Missouri also has a freewheeling general service statute appli-
cable to foreign corporations; 6 9 a strong court rule permitting local per-
sonal jurisdiction over Missouri domiciliaries served outside the state;17 0
and since 1961 a statute in the Vermont pattern authorizing local jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations committing torts in Missouri.17'
The constitutionality of the Missouri nonresident motorist statute's
express application to the "executor, administrator or other legal representa-
tive" of a deceased nonresident motorist 17 2 was solidly upheld by the
Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Sullivani v. Cross (Mo. En Banc
1958). 173 There has been some difficulty with the statutory method of
160. § 379.280, RSMo 1959; Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.20.
- 161. § 409.100, RSMo 1959.
162. § 362.435, .445, RSMo 1959.
163. § 363.205 RSMo 1959.
164. § 394.200, RSMo 1959.
165. §§ 416.510-.560, RSMo 1959.
166. § 508.070, RSMo 1959; Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.19.
167. §§ 506.200-.320, RSMo 1959; Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.13-.18.
168. §§ 506.330-.340, RSMo 1959; Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.13-.18.
169. § 506.150(3) RSMo 1959: ". . . Service shall be made as follows: . . .
(3) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership, or other unin-
corporated association, when by law it inay be sued as such, by delivering a copy
of the summons and of the petition to an officer, partner, a managing or general
agent, or by leaving the copies at any business office of the defendant with the
person having charge thereof, or to any other agent authorized by appointment
or required by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to
the defendant." (Emphasis added.) Cf. Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.06(c) (1).
170. Mo. R. Civ. P. 54.07(a): "Personal service outside the state of summons
and petition may be made in any action upon any party who at the time of com-
mencement of the action or at the time of service was domiciled in this state, and
such service shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons and
petition within this state and shall warrant a general judgment (in personam)
against the party so served." The constitutionality of such exercise of jurisdiction
has been made clear by Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); cf. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1878), quoted in text at note 32 supra. Cf. CAL. CIv. PRO.
CODE § 417 (1963 Supp.), quoted in text at note 133 supra; California cases cited
in note 134 supra; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW AND RULES § 313 (1963). Whether a court
rule meets the requirements of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, text at notes 72-3 supra, is
another question.
171. §§ 351.630(2)-(5), 355.375(2)-(5), RSMo 1961 Supp., quoted in text at
note 217 infra.
172. § 506.210, RSMo 1959.
173. 314 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. En Banc 1958), noted 25 Mo. L. REv. 83 (1960).
Cf. Brooks v. National Bank, 251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958).
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notice of the service upon the Secretary of State: Parker v. Bond (Mo.
En Banc 1959)174 held that the copy of the notice of service mailed by the
Secretary of State to the nonresident defendant must actually reach him;
notice merely mailed with the reasonable probability that it would reach
him does not suffice. The court thought its decision consistent with
Wuchter v. Pizz'Utti,175 in that "notice to an incorrect or false address
would be no better notification than requiring no mailing at all."'17 Also,
it has been held that an attempt to constructively serve a Missouri resident
under the statute is void; the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case that
the defendant is a nonresident.177
Missouri's attitude toward the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
outsiders is best shown in the application of its general service statute on
foreign corporations. Section 506.150(3),178 authorizes constructive service
upon a foreign corporation "when by law it may be sued as such." On its
face, this is equivalent to New Jersey's rule of procedure providing for
similar service "subject to due process of law."' 79 But state and federal
courts in Missouri have been very careful in their application of this
statute, demonstrating extreme reluctance to exercise jurisdiction. This can
be shown only by presenting some of the cases in detail.
Wooster v. Trimont Mfg. Co. (Mo. Div. 1, 1947)110 held jurisdiction
proper in a suit to recover commissions due plaintiffs, manufacturers' agents
with an office in St. Louis, for selling the products of Trimont, a Massachu-
setts corporation, whose president was served the process in Missouri.
Trimont was engaged in the manufacture of pipe tools at its factory in
Roxbury, Massachusetts-selling only to the wholesale trade. It furnished
plaintiffs with catalogues, discount sheets, samples, sales data, and informa-
tion on competitors' products, had its name placed upon plaintiffs' office
door, on the office building directory, in the St. Louis telephone and post
office directories, and on plaintiffs' letterhead, using plaintiffs' office as a
174. 330 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. En Banc 1959), overruling Williams v. Shrout, 294
S.W.2d 640 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 929 (1957). The Court
interpreted §§ 506.240 and 506.200(2), RSMo 1959 to preclude jurisdiction, by in-
sufficient service, unless the notice be sent by "restricted, registered mail" and the
nonresident either receipt for the delivery of the mail or the postal authorities
establish that he refused to receive or receipt for it. Cf. Saffeels v. Fruehauf, 210 F.
Supp. 70 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
175. See text at notes 72-3 supra.
176. Supra note 174 at 125.
177. State ex rel. Lesliy v. Aronson, 362 S.W.2d 61 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
178. Quoted in note 169 supra.
179. See note 82 supra.
180. 356 Mo. 682, 203 S.W.2d 411 (Div. 1, 1947).
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mailing address in its business. It employed missionary men to solicit large
buyers in Missouri, held at least one salesmen's meeting in St. Louis,
authorized plaintiffs to adjust complaints in Missouri and collect accounts
there, and, from 1941 through 1943, received 1,420 customers as a result
of plaintiffs' activities in its behalf and business totaling over $114,000.
The court believed the International Harvester "solicitation plus" rule
applicable and, in view of the broadening tendencies in International Shoe,
was "constrained to rule that, under the facts here, defendant was doing
business in this state to the extent of making it amenable to the process
served upon it."181
Hayman v. Southern Pacific Co. (Mo. Div. 1, 1955)182 denied jurisdic-
tion over Southern Pacific, a Delaware corporation owning or operating rail-
road facilities in the west and southwest but none in Missouri, in a suit under
the Federal Employers Liability Act by a Missouri resident who had been
injured in California while working as a brakeman on a Southern Pacific
train. Pullman and freight cars from Southern Pacific trains were brought
into Missouri by other railways, and Southern Pacific had operated offices
for solicitation purposes in St. Louis and Kansas City for 15 years, in the
charge of local general agents and employing a total of 20 people. Occa-
sionally collections were made or claims for loss handled at these offices.
The court thought the case similar to Green v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry. ("mere solicitation"), distinguishing Wooster v. Trimont Mfg.
Co. on the ground that there the obligation sued upon had arisen out of
the defendant's activities in Missouri and in addition Trimont was a
"solicitation plus" case. The court declared, "it seems to us that the most
reasonable and satisfactory rule is to hold that a state has jurisdiction
of any action against a foreign corporation which seeks to enforce an
obligation or liability arising out of acts done in the state by its agents.1'13
The holding purported to commit Missouri to the rule that jurisdiction
would not be sustained unless the cause of action had arisen in Missouri
from activity of the defendant there.184 The court thought, in so ruling, it
was following International Shoe which it considered a "solicitation plus"
181. Id. at 687, 203 S.W.2d at 414.
182. 278 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. Div. 1, 1955).
183. Id. at 752. The Court cited McBaine, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corpora-
tions: Actions Arising Out of Acts Done Within the Forum, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 331
(1946).
184. See Comment, Jurisdiction Over Unlicensed Foreign Corporations in Mis-
souri, 23 Mo. L. REv. 190 (1958).
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case like International Harvester. Of course, the Missouri court need not
exercise jurisdiction in any case, but when it suggested that denial of jurisdic-
tion over Southern Pacific was required by International Shoe, particularly
as applied in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,185 it injected
questionable law into the Missouri picture.
Collar v. Peninsular Gas Co. (Mo. Div. 1, 1956)186 clearly showed Mis-
souri's reluctance to exercise jurisdiction. Peninsular, a Michigan corporation,
had sued Collar, a Kansas resident doing business in Kansas City, Missouri,
in a Missouri court, and in the present action Collar brought suit against
Peninsular for malicious prosecution of the earlier suit. Service was had
upon Peninsular's president in the Phillips Hotel, downtown Kansas City,
Missouri, shortly after trial in the first suit. It was held that in order to
exercise jurisdiction in such a case the foreign corporation must be doing
business in Missouri, and this required that the corporation "must have
entered the state and engaged there in carrying on and transacting, through
its agents, the ordinary business in which it is engaged," "some sub-
stantial part of its usual and ordinary business.1 817 Peninsular's suit "was
but a single, isolated act and not a part of the usual and customary business
of the defendant." 88 Collar's argument that Peninsular had submitted to
the jurisdiction of the courts of Missouri by its earlier suit was rejected.
"We see nothing in that conduct which, according to our notions of fair
play and substantial justice, would require a holding that the defendant
be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state in the litigation
of the instant claim.' 89
Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp. (Mo. En Banc 1963) '18 sustained
personal jurisdiction over Caloric, a Pennsylvania corporation, in a prop-
erty damage suit brought by Missourians, Mr. and Mrs. Morrow, in the
Circuit Court of Scott County, Missouri, for the destruction of the contents
of their home by a fire caused by an allegedly defective Caloric gas range
purchased from a local Missouri dealer. Service was had upon Walter L.
185. See text at notes 50-1 supra. Cf. Comment, State Court Jurisdiction Ove,
Foreign Corporations: Due Process Requirements for a Cause of Action Unrelated
to Corporate Activity Within the Forum State, 7 ST. L. U. L. J. 168 (1962).
186. 295 S.W.2d 88 (Mo. Div. 1, 1956).
187. Id. at 91. The Court cited State ex rel. Ferrocarriles Nacionales De Mexico
v. Rutledge, 331 Mo. 1015, 56 S.W.2d 28 (Div. 1, 1932) and Nathan v. Planters'
Cotton Oil Co., 187 Mo. App. 560, 174 S.W. 126 (K.C. 1915), both decided long
before International Shoe.
188. Id. at 92.
189. Id. at 93.
190. 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
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Vocke in St. Louis County, Missouri, a manufacturer's representative and
operator of a service agency for Caloric. From an office in his home in
St. Louis County, Vocke represented Caloric in an exclusive territory
covering the area within a radius of 150 miles from St. Louis. Caloric
carried an advertisement for its appliances in the "yellow pages" of the
St. Louis telephone directory listing Vocke's office address. Caloric sup-
plied Vocke with business cards, letterheads, catalogues, and similar mate-
rial, and Vocke received mail addressed to Caloric at the office address.
Vocke was paid a commission on all Caloric appliances sold in his territory,
and thus promoted Caloric's business as much as possible. He obtained
orders from distributors and dealers, including Uregas Company in Cape
Girardeau, the main Caloric distributor in outstate Missouri. Caloric adver-
tised in newspapers and on television stations in Missouri. Basic prices
of the appliances were set by Caloric. Some appliance orders were sold
direct to dealers and others sold to Vocke, in lieu of consignment to the
dealers. Caloric rented a warehouse in St. Louis, Missouri, and kept a
large stock of appliances there, from which about half of all the orders
from Vocke's territory were supplied. Caloric's business in Vocke's territory
amounted to about $200,000 annually. The court believed that whether
Caloric was amenable to local jurisdiction in Missouri depended upon its
"doing business" there, and held that it was. Reviewing the Trlimont,
Hayman, and Collar cases, the court thought the activities of Caloric in
Missouri sufficient to satisfy due process, and that under the Hayman rule,
the liability had arisen out of an act done by a Caloric agent or agents
in the state. Moreover, the case squarely fit the Trimont ruling, since there
was a continuous course of Missouri business, rather than the single or
isolated act present in the Collar case. The court quoted extensively from
Hayman, perpetuating the view that International Shoe was a "solicitation
plus" case with no discussion of the real meaning of that case, its subsequent
application by state and federal courts or even by the Supreme Court, or
its minimum. contacts test and "fair play" emphasis. The court's analysis
was couched in the framework of the demands of fourteenth amendment
due process; in fact, the case was before it only for that reason, having
been transferred there from the Springfield Court of Appeals by reason
of the federal constitutional issue.191
This line of Missouri decisions grounds local jurisdiction on the "doing
business" test which was wholly abandoned by the Supreme Court in
191. 362 S.W.2d 282 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
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International S/oe in 1945.192 The "doing business" test has a quality of
objectivity lacking in the minimum contacts test which replaced it, and
the Missouri court may be jurisprudentially sound in adhering to it. The
minimum contacts test has opened the door to what may become a Pandora's
box, weakening state sovereignty in a manner similar to encroaching federal
power' 03 and creating an atmosphere conducive to conflict between the
states. But there is no assurance the Missouri court is conscious of the
direction it is heading in these cases. Its opinions apply the "doing business"
test as a requirement of fourteenth amendment due process or the Inter-
national S/oe case itself, rather than as purposeful Missouri law.
The major drawback of the "doing business" test, and this appears
particularly in the Missouri cases, is its preoccupation with facts removed
from the cause of action sued upon. The Caloric case is a good example:
plaintiffs Morrow sued Caloric for fire damage to the contents of their
home caused by a defective gas range, yet in order to decide the jurisdic-
tional issue the court examined the details of the relationship between
outsider Caloric and agent Vocke, other business relationships Caloric had
with Missouri, and even the amount of gross sales of Caloric appliances in
the state. The Morrows' right to sue in a convenient local court is de-
pendent upon facts of no concern or importance to them or their property
loss. The minimum contacts test with its emphasis upon "fair play" obviates
much of this, and a part of the trend in American law since International
Shoe is to obliterate this distinction between jurisdictional facts and the
facts giving rise to the litigation. The present case development under the
minimum contacts test is toward an appraisal of more realistic jurisdictional
facts.
True, Caloric and Trimont allowed local jurisdiction, however grounded.
The Hayman denial of jurisdiction also was sound; that case was a suit
under the Federal Employers Liability Act, section 6 of which provides
that the action "may be brought . . . in the district of the residence of
the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the de-
fendant shall be doing business .. .,,14 (emphasis added), so the "doing
business" test had a real application, since Southern Pacific did not reside
192. Justice Black, for the Court, in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 222 (1957): "In a continuing process of evolution this Court accepted
and then abandoned 'consent,' 'doing business,' and 'presence' as the standard for
measuring the extent of state judicial power over such corporations."
193. See note 9 supra.
194. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
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in Missouri and the cause of action did not arise there. The Collar case
is the doubtful one; after Peninsular had sued Collar in a Missouri court,
it seems unfair to require him to go to an inconvenient court in Michigan
to sue Peninsular for malicious prosecution of the earlier suit.
More important, perhaps, the Missouri court's continued adherence
to the "doing business" test as a due process requirement under Inter-
national Shoe has left the federal courts in Missouri without proper direc-
tion. Recent cases in those courts have shown a striking reluctance to
exercise jurisdiction, sometimes based upon distinctions, apparently taken
from Missouri law, wholly out-of-tune with the present trend in American
law since International Skoe.
Pucci v. Blatz Brewing Co. (W.D. Mo. 1955)195 involved an action
against Blatz, a Wisconsin corporation, which formerly had been licensed
to do business in Missouri but had abandoned that license four years
before the suit. Service was had upon one Rocco Bunimo, a Blatz vice
president, while he was staying at a hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, and
jurisdiction was predicated upon Blatz' activities within the state. Blatz
had no office, place of business or regular salesman in Missouri and main-
tained no stock of merchandise there, but it did sell great quantities of
beer through local Missouri distributors, f.o.b. Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and
had one or two employees whose sole duties were to encourage and develop
a demand for Blatz beer in Missouri. These local distributors, including
McKisiick in Kansas City, were independent entrepreneurs who received
advertising allowances from Blatz, displayed the Blatz legend on their
delivery trucks and were listed in telephone directories under the name
"Blatz Beer." The alleged cause of action arose out of a Missouri real estate
transaction entered into in 1944, six years before Blatz surrendered its
license to do business in Missouri, and was unrelated to its present activities
there. Denying personal jurisdiction, the court held, under Missouri law,
the defendant must be "doing business" in the state to be subject to juris-
diction, and "doing business" was equivalent to "'continuous and systemat-
ic' activity in, or contact with, or within, the state of Missouri." '19  The
court, recognizing that "Missouri does not assert the full constitutional
breadth of process power, as did the state of Washington" in International
Stoe,197 ruled even that case would not permit jurisdiction on these facts,
195. 127 F.Supp. 747 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
196. Id. at 749.
197. Id. at 750.
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where Blatz' conduct was limited to isolated activities in Missouri and the
cause of action was unconnected with those activities. Though the court
accurately detected Missouri's reluctance to exercise jurisdiction and thus
probably reached a decision in accord with Missouri law, its ruling that
International Shoe would not permit jurisdiction in this case is certainly
questionable, especially since Travelers Health Association v. Virginia,',
applying International Shoe to less activity in Virginia than Blatz engaged
in in Missouri, and in view of the fact that the cause of action arose in
Missouri.
Fore v. Family Publications Service (E.D. Mo. 1957),1-9 involved a
suit by the former manager of Family Publications' St. Louis office for
damages for failure to supply a service letter at termination of employment
as required by Missouri law.200 Family Publications, a New York corpora-
tion, with its main offices in New York City and New Jersey, maintained
a St. Louis office, employing independent salesmen there to solicit magazine
subscriptions which were delivered to that office and forwarded to New
Jersey for acceptance or rejection. It employed an independent collection
force, made all its employment contracts in New York, and sent funds to
the St. Louis office for local expenses and payment for solicited orders.
Service of process was made upon the person in charge of the St. Louis
office. The court held jurisdiction proper, declaring, "surely it is not undue
for the defendant to be required to answer for a wrong arising out of this
employment which is at the very core of its activities.12 0' The court pur-
ported to apply International Harvester and International Shoe, and the
Missouri Hayman and Collar cases. The decision is an exceptional one
among Missouri cases, finding jurisdiction on such limited local activity,
but may be consistent with the rest since the action arose directly out of
Family Publications' local activity. Shannon v. Brown & Williamson Tobac-
co Corp. (W.D. Mo. 1958),202 however, denied jurisdiction on similar facts in
a suit by Shannon, a former employee of the defendant B & W, a Delaware
corporation with its principal office in Kentucky. Shannon had been em-
ployed as a solicitor under Jones, B & W's division sales manager, who
resided in Springfield, Missouri, for the purpose of calling upon retailers
to stimulate sales of B & W products and encouraging patronage of local
198. See text following note 52 supra.
199. 157 F.Supp. 572 (E.D. Mo. 1957).
200. § 290.140, RSMo 1959.
201. 157 F.Supp. at 575.
202. 167 F.Supp. 493 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
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independent wholesalers and jobbers in Missouri who handled B & W
products. B & W had no office or property in Missouri, gave Shannon
instructions from its office in Kentucky and paid him by check drawn there.
Service was had upon Jones in Springfield. There is no clear indication in
the opinion as to what the suit is about, but presumably it arose out of
the employment relationship. The court held the case within the "mere
solicitation" rule, citing and discussing Green v. Ckicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry., Hayman, Collar, and Trimont, among other cases. The court
stated: "Missouri has expressed a willingness to extend its jurisdiction
over foreign corporations to the limits allowed within the bounds of due
process.'203 The same court had stated to the contrary three years earlier
in PuCCi,20- and such a misunderstanding must be traceable to the Missouri
court's opinions applying the "doing business" test as a supposed require-
ment of due process under International Skoe. The federal court for
western Missouri did not cite Fiore, decided by the federal court for eastern
Missouri, and the two cases seem inconsistent.
Long v. Victor Products Corp. (8th Cir. 1961),205 typically denied
jurisdiction, in an action brought in the federal court for eastern Missouri,
by Missouri citizens against Victor, a New York corporation engaged in
the manufacture and sale of refrigeration equipment in Maryland and
West Virginia. The suit was brought for breach of a contract executed in
Maryland, and service was had upon Victor's chairman of the board and
a vice president while they were staying at the Chase Hotel in St. Louis.
Victor maintained no office or property in Missouri, but employed a sales-
man there who solicited orders and had the title of district sales manager.
During the preceding two years it sold and shipped equipment to forty
purchasers in Missouri, but serviced this equipment only in Maryland.
From 1958 to 1960, it displayed equipment at four separate conventions or
meetings in St. Louis at the invitation and expense of the sponsors (7up,
Dr. Pepper, etc.), and at one of these meetings, sold units of equipment to
purchasers outside Missouri and shipped this equipment directly from a
display at the St. Louis hotel meeting site. The court held Victor's local
activities "mere solicitation," citing Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Ry., Hayman, and Shannon v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. After
citing and discussing a number of cases, the court stated: "While, as we
203. Id. at 494.
204. See text at note 197 supra.
205. 297 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1961).
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have noted, these cases are often close, and the line defining the limit of
jurisdictional due process is not always easy to locate, we are in agreement
with the district court's conclusion that, under the circumstances present
here, jurisdiction was lacking. '208
Wash, v. Western Empire Life Insurance Co. (8th Cir. 1962)207 affirmed
an order of the federal court for western Missouri denying jurisdiction in
an action by Mr. and Mrs. Wash, Missourians, against Western, a Colorado
insurance corporation, to recover the proceeds of a life insurance policy
issued by Western to their son, who had since died. Western had not legally
qualified to do business in Missouri and claimed it had never done any
such business: the application for the particular life insurance involved
read on its face that it was dated at Denver, Colorado, and witnessed
there. Plaintiffs' affidavits established as a matter of fact that the applica-
tion had been executed, the policy sold, and the initial premium paid in
Missouri. Apparently, a Colorado agent for Western was related to a
member of the Wash family and issued the policy in Missouri without
any authority to do so or even knowledge on the part of Western. Service
was had under the unauthorized insurers process statute.208 The court ruled
a foreign insurance company like Western would not be brought within
the jurisdiction of Missouri courts when it had no knowledge of the local
transaction and had not acquiesced in it, disregarding the International
Shoe and McGee cases on the ground that the issue was not Missouri's
"'power' to subject" Western to jurisdiction, but rather "whether or not
the legislature, in enacting the substituted service section, intended that
knowledge on the part of the appellee be a prerequisite to valid service
of process." 20 D The court could only guess what the Missouri law on that
point was. This is a clear example of judicial reluctance to exercise juris-
diction, especially so, since the case law presented to the court firmly
upheld jurisdiction. The Colorado agent's issuance of the policy was the
responsibility of Western, which enabled him to do so, and the risk of his
authority should not fall on the beneficiaries under the policy, at least as
far as jurisdiction is concerned. The ruling injects a new roadblock to
jurisdiction: a foreign corporation now can argue that its alleged local
activity, or even some part of it, was not authorized, and cast further
206. Id. at 583.
207. 298 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1962).
208. §§ 375.160-.161, RSMo 1959.
209. Supra note 207 at 378.
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doubt upon whether the requisite quantum of "doing business" in Missouri
is shown.
Jennings v. McCall Corporation (W.D. Mo. 1962)210 denied jurisdiction
in an interesting case. McCall, a Delaware corporation with its principal
office in New York City, is engaged in the business of publishing magazines
(McCall's and Redbook) and in the business of design, production, and
sale of printed patterns used to make dresses and other garments. Stores
in Missouri regularly purchase patterns from McCall's offices located in
Chicago and New York City. McCall employed a salesman named Bleuher
out of its New York office, who covered Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and
Missouri for the pattern division, soliciting pattern sales and servicing
existing accounts. McCall also employed three women who operated out
of a rented office in Kansas City, soliciting magazine subscriptions by
telephone. Plaintiff Bertha Jennings, in 1956, attended a meeting of the
Missouri Home Economics Association, held in Kansas City, Missouri, at
which Kit Mason, director of McCall's pattern division, presented patterns
for spring fabrics. Bertha Jennings talked to Mason about a novel and
unique idea she had to improve dress patterns and learned how to write
the proper McCall office in New York City. She then corresponded with
McCall in New York City about her idea and sent the confidential details,
but McCall advised her the idea would not be used and returned the
letter containing the details. Somewhat later, McCall announced a "revolu-
tionary" improvement in dress patterns, which Bertha Jennings claimed
was hers, and she brought this suit. Service of process was had upon
Bleuher while he was in Kansas City, Missouri. The court, admitting
McCall was conducting sufficient activities and business in Missouri to
render it subject to the jurisdiction of Missouri courts, declined to exercise
jurisdiction because "notwithstanding the nature and extent of its business,
the particular nature of business which is the basis of this suit, was not a
part of its business activities in the State of Missouri." '11 Trimont was
distinguished since there the cause of action arose out of the business
transacted in Missouri; here, the suit pertained "to a phase of its business
that was entirely in the State of New York," 212 and "that insofar as the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is concerned, it was not
doing business within the State of Missouri, and not subject to process
210. 218 F.Supp. 662 (W.D. Mo. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963).
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within this state."213 The view that the cause of action sued upon must
arise out of the foreign corporation's activities in the forum is consistent
with the ruling by the Missouri court in Hayman, though in that case
the cause of action itself arose entirely outside the state.
There is nothing in International Shoe or its progeny to require this
kind of ruling in the Jennings case. Where there was sufficient local activity
by the foreign corporation in the state, as the Jennings court admitted
there was, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 21 4 held the fact
that the cause of action arose outside the forum, and was unrelated to the
defendant's activity there, no bar to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
In Jennings it is not clear where the cause of action arose; the court never
considered that question. If, as a matter of fact, it did arise in whole
or in part in Missouri, that would be all the more reason for the
exercise of jurisdiction over McCall. Sanders Associates, Inc. v. Galion Iron
Works & Mfg. Co.2 15 found jurisdiction on similar facts, reversing the trial
court which had denied jurisdiction on the ground that the contract sued
upon had no relation with the foreign corporation's local activities.
The major drawback of the "doing business" test, its preoccupation
with facts removed from the cause of action sued upon, is compounded
by the Jennings ruling. The Missouri court's recent Caloric decision found
jurisdiction by reason of Caloric's extensive activity in Missouri, which
was at best remotely connected with the plaintiffs' suit, but Jennings rules
there must be this remote connection; otherwise jurisdiction is to be denied.
If the Jennings ruling is correct, and it can draw some support from Hay-
man, as mentioned above, personal jurisdiction over outsiders in 'Missouri
is further restricted; the trend in Missouri law would then appear to be
opposed to the general trend in American law, rather than merely dragging
along behind it. In effect the Jennings ruling elevates the "mere solicitation"
rule2"o to one of "mere doing business." Missouri law in this respect is
less favorable for the exercise of local jurisdiction than Supreme Court
decisions dating back to 1907. If and when Missouri courts come to grips
with the minimavm contacts test as announced in International Sloe and
applied in later cases, anomalies of this sort can be avoided. But so long
as the "doing business" test is adhered to and applied as a supposed
213. Id. at 667, 320 F.2d at 67, 70-2.
214. See text at notes 50-1 supra.
215. Text at notes 121-25 swpra.
216. For a statement of rule, see text at notes 44-5 supra.
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requirement of due process under International Sthoe, anomalies will con-
tinue, as an unavoidable consequence of attempts to apply inconsistent
legal principles (from the "doing business" test on the one hand to Inter-
-national Stoe on the other) to the examination of jurisdictional facts re-
moved from and often irrelevant to the actual facts sued upon.
The Missouri legislature has provided an opportunity to clear up
some of these difficulties by its 1961 enactment of the following Vermont-
style statute authorizing local jurisdiction over foreign corporations com-
mitting torts in Missouri:2 17
2. If a foreign corporation commits a tort, excepting libel
and slander, in whole or in part in Missouri against a resident or
nonresident of Missouri, such act shall be deemed to be doing
business in Missouri by the foreign corporation and shall be deemed
equivalent to the appointment by the foreign corporation of the
secretary of state of Missouri and his successors to be its agent and
representative to accept service of any process in any actions or
proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from or growing
out of the tort. Service on the secretary of state of any such
process shall be made by delivering to and leaving with him
or with any clerk having charge of the corporation depart-
ment of his office, duplicate copies of the process. The committing
of the tort shall be deemed to be the agreement of the foreign
corporation that any process against it which is so served upon
the secretary of state shall be of the same legal force and effect
as if served personally within the state of Missouri.
3. In the event that any process, notice, or demand is served
on the secretary of state, he shall immediately cause a copy thereof
217. §§ 351.630(2)-(5), 355.375(2)-(5), RSMo 1961 Surp. Cf. Jacobson, The
Enlargement of Jtrisdiction Over Unlicensed Foreign Corporations in Missouri-
The "Single-Act Statute," 31 U.K.C. L. REv. 292 (1963). House Bill No. 718, con-
sidered by the 72nd General Assembly in 1963, but not enacted, would have gone
further; it provided:
Section 1. 1. Personal service outside the state of summons and petition
may be made in any action upon any party who has submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, and the service shall have the
force and effect of personal service of summons and petition within this
state and shall warrant a general judgment in personam against the party
so served.
2. Any individual who commits a tortious act within this state there-
by submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
cause of action arising from the act.
3. Service outside the state as provided in this section shall be made
by an officer authorized by law to serve process in civil actions within the
state or territory where the service is made, or by his deputy, by deliver-
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to be forwarded by registered mail, return receipt requested, ad-
dressed to the secretary of such corporation at its principal office
as the same appears in the records of the secretary of state ...
This shows a broadening policy for Missouri. The statute is framed
in accord with the minimum contact standard, but even under the "doing
business" test, a foreign corporation committing a local tort can now be
treated as "doing business" in Missouri. The statute could have been
applied in the Caloric case,2 1 8 would have permitted jurisdiction in Collar
v. Peninsular Gas Co., and should have helped Bertha Jennings. There has
been little hesitation in applying this kind of statute retroactively in other
states, but such application has been denied in Missouri.219 The constitu-
tionality of the statute, though never passed upon by the Supreme Court,
does not appear in doubt.220 Active application of the statute could precip-
itate a real change in the cautious attitude of Missouri courts regarding the
exercise of local personal jurisdiction, and bring Missouri more in line with
the present American trend.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The American law of personal jurisdiction has been anchored in a territo-
rial framework by state boundary lines. At least since Pennoyer v. Neff (U.S.
1878), distinct methods for exercising jurisdiction by local personal serv-
ice and constructive service have evolved. Personal service of process upon
individual outsiders within the forum state, however temporarily, has
become a ground for local jurisdiction. In the case of foreign corporations,
since such personal service was impossible under prevailing views as to
corporate structure and authority, indirect methods were devised grounding
jurisdiction upon local "presence" or "doing business" with a proper kind
of constructive service. These developments led to the recognition of two
218. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., text at
notes 97-101 supra, Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., text at notes 104-05 supra, and
Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., text at notes 112-13 supra.
219. State ex tel. Clay Equipment Corp. v. Jensen, 363 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. En
Banc 1963), holding the statute operates prospectively only since otherwise it
would change the legal effect of past transactions. Cf. text at notes 90-2 supra.
220. The trend of recent state and federal court cases presented supra, text
at notes 74-155, is the best proof. The Supreme Court in McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), did cite in a footnote with apparent ap-
proval Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., text at note 103 supra, uphold-
holding the constitutionality of the Vermont statute under due process, and the
Missouri statute is patterned after the Vermont statute.
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fundamental requirements: that there be some power-basis for the forum
court to act upon the outsider, such as the outsider's "doing business" in
the forum state, and that certain procedural safeguards be undertaken and
satisfied to protect the outsider's rights, such as due notice of the suit
and an opportunity to be heard.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington (U.S. 1945) abandoned the rigid
bases "presence" and "doing business," and announced a flexible due process
standard for personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations, grounded upon
local activity or contacts-within the vague confines of "fair play." This
flexible standard, shifting the emphasis to "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" came to be called the minimum contacts test.
As the test was applied in state and federal courts, territorial limitations
remained as little more than grudging geographical practicality. The power-
basis requirement absorbed the new flexibility, and subsequent statutes
and court decisions in many states grounded personal jurisdiction upon
ever-narrowing and more particularized power-bases or local contacts, such
as the outsider's commission of a single tortious act or its presence upon
a single insurance risk within the forum state. A trend, in state and federal
courts, resembling a frenzy to exercise jurisdiction appeared, sometimes
overriding applicable older state statutes and case precedent. Minimum
contacts became more and more minimal. The Supreme Court gave its
stamp of approval to this trend in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.
(U.S. 1957).
This trend has not spread to Missouri. The Missouri Supreme Court
repeatedly has demonstrated a reluctance and cautious approach in the
exercise of jurisdiction over outsiders. In its decisions, the Missouri court
has treated International Shoe as little more than a variation on earlier
law requiring that personal jurisdiction be grounded upon a foreign corpora-
tion's substantial "presence" or "doing business" in the forum state. Its
opinions have applied International Shoe as though the Supreme Court
in that case had established a due process requirement that the outsider
be present to the extent of "doing business" in the state. This interpreta-
tion and application of International Shoe has caused considerable confusion
in the Missouri cases, particularly those in the federal courts for Missouri.221
221. Fiore v. Family Publications Service, 157 F.Supp. 572 (E.D. Mo. 1957), in
an opinion by the late Judge Weber, seems to have correctly applied International
Shoe; see text at notes 199-201 supra.
19631
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The minimum contacts test at best has been given a ritualistic application,
conforming it to the older "doing business" standard.
Missouri courts must sooner or later come to grips with the mninimwm
contacts test as it is applied by the Supreme Court and other state and
federal courts throughout the nation. The Missouri Supreme Court need
not accept the minimum contacts test: it has proven to be no panacea
and may turn out to be a Pandora's box. Grounds for local personal
jurisdiction are for the Missouri court to determine, limited only by con-
stitutional requirements which are wide open under the minimum contacts
test. The Missouri court has the leeway and should recognize its power
and duty in this area at the first opportunity, putting an end to the
present confusion stemming from its interpretation and application of
International Shoe to date. The 1961 Missouri legislature enacted a juris-
diction-enlarging statute presumably indicating a policy of expanded local
personal jurisdiction. 222 This should jar Missouri courts out of their lethargy.
There is a strong need on the national scene for a constructive approach
to the matter of personal jurisdiction, which has led to occasional reckless
exercises of jurisdiction over outsiders. 223 Equally important, there is a
special need for new direction in Missouri where reluctance to take jurisdic-
tion on occasion has appeared pathetic.
224
222. See text at notes 217-20 supra.
223. Consider the implications of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., text at notes 97-101 supra; Hoagland v. Springer, text at notes 118-19
supra; and Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., text at notes 136-39
supra.
224. Consider Jennings v. McCall Corp., text at notes 210-16 supra.
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II. DIVORCE
A. Jurisdiction of Missouri Courts to Divorce
While the two meanings are often inseparable in the cases, it should
be noted that the statutory "jurisdiction" of courts is not always the
same as "jurisdiction" in the sense of that power which entitles a decree
to full faith and credit in the interstate concept. When reference is made
to "jurisdiction," an effort has been made to delineate which meaning is
used.
1. Residence and Domicile
a. Of one party as the foundation of jurisdiction
The Missouri courts, as a general principle, have based jurisdiction to
divorce almost exclusively upon the theory, approved as a foundation for
requiring full faith and credit in Williams v. North Carolina I, 4 that the
marital status of the parties is a quasi-res in the domicile of either party.
If a plaintiff is a domiciliary of the State of Missouri, the courts have
jurisdiction over the marital status with power to divorce upon personal,
constructive or mailed service to the other party. Perhaps one of the
clearest and leading expressions of this concept is contained in Howey v.
Howey:G
... (1) A divorce suit is a proceeding in rem; (2) the status of
husband and wife is the res; (3) this status attaches to each of the
parties; (4) such status (the res) goes with each of the parties to
their respective domiciles; (5) if they happen to have separate
domiciles, the wife can have a separate domicile from the husband;
(6) every state has the sovereign right to determine the domestic
relations of all persons having their domicile within its territory;
3. In this regard, it should always be borne in mind that divorce is basically
a statutory power granted to the courts and that the exercise of this power is
limited to statutory auhority. Watts v. Watts, 304 Mo. 361, 263 S.W. 421 (1924);
Chapman v. Chapman, 269 Mo. 663, 192 S.W. 448, reversing 194 Mo. App. 483, 185
S.W. 221 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916); Stack v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 340, 143 S.W. 450
(1911); Tureck v. Tureck, 207 S.W.2d 780 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948).
4. 317 U.S. 287 (1942). See also Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953),
vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
5. Howey v. Howey, 240 S.W. 450 (Mo. En Banc 1922), cert. denied 269
U.S. 730 (1922); Wagoner v. Wagoner, 287 Mo. 567, 229 S.W. 1064 (1920);
Howard v. Strode, 242 Mo. 210, 146 S.W. 792 (1912); Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 1,
143 S.W. 458 (1911); Anthony v. Rice, 110 Mo. 223, 19 S.W. 423 (1892); State
ex rel. Miller v. Jones, 349 S.W.2d 534 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Hanna v. Hanna,
224 Mo. App. 1142, 32 S.W.2d 125 (St. L. Ct. App. 1930); Keena v. Keena, 222
Mo. App. 825, 10 S.W.2d 344 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928).
6. Howey v. Howey, supra note 5.
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(7) where either husband or wife has a domicile in the state, the
courts of the state have jurisdiction over the status (the res) and
for proper causes can dissolve the marriage relations; and (8)
the decree so pronounced is a judgment in rem.
The publication statutes, when employed here, must be strictly complied
with.,
If, on the other hand, the party seeking the divorce is not a domiciliary,
the Missouri courts have almost universally held they are without jurisdic-
tion.' This is usually the view even when the conduct upon which the
grounds are based occurred within the state.9 Once jurisdiction is acquired,
however, domicile does not appear to be necesary to continue jurisdiction,
and the power of the court to divorce may survive a change of domicile
after instigation of suit, but prior to the rendition of the decree, although
the rule is not clear in this regard.' 0
It may be noted that the Missouri statute requires a residence of one
year rather than domicile." Judicial interpretation has usually been that
the two are equivalent and that resident, as used in Section 452.050, RSMo
1959, means domicile."2 This section also grants jurisdiction to circuit courts
to divorce in the absence of a year's residence or domicile where the acts
constituting grounds for divorce are committed within the state.'3 In this
event, however, domicile is still required to confer jurisdiction although it
need not be for a year.' 4 In some instances, the application of this require-
7. Cox v. Cox, 115 S.W.2d 104 (Spr. Mo. App. 1938).
8. Wright v. Wright, 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d 870 (En Banc 1942); Kruse
v. Kruse, 25 Mo. 68 (1857); Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838
(K.C. Ct. App. 1952); McConnell v. McConnell, 167 Mo. App. 680, 151 S.W. 175
(St. L. Ct. App. 1912); Pate v. Pate, 6 Mo. App. 49 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
9. Kruse v. Kruse, 25 Mo. 68 (1857).
10. In Schneider v. Friend, 361 S.W.2d 308 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962), plaintiff
had acquired a Missouri domicile at the time her petition was filed but had moved
without the state prior to the rendition of the final decree. The court held that
even if she had changed her domicile the Missouri courts retained jurisdiction.
This may be simply dictum, however, because the court made it clear it was not
necessarily convinced that a change in residence had taken place.
It is clear under the Missouri decisions, however, that once the decree has been
entered, jurisdiction continues for the purpose of modification. See cases under
note 89 infra.
11. § 452.050, RSMo 1959.
12. Scotton v. Scotton, 359 S.W.2d 501 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962); Grant v.
Grant, 324 S.W.2d 382 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959); State ex rel. Stoffey v. LaDriere, 273
S.W.2d 776 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954); Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246
S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952).
13. § 452.050, RSMo 1959.
14. Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App.
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ment has been based upon the statutory language requiring the action to
be brought in the county of plaintiff's residence.25 Another view is that this
last statute is not jurisdictional but controls venue only,16 in which case
the requirement of domicile must be considered to be court-attached to
fulfill the requirements for full faith and credit. There is no statutory re-
quirement that the acts constituting grounds for divorce have been com-
mitted within the state and, so long as the domicile or residence require-
ment of one year is met, the courts will grant relief for acts committed
elsewhere, but which constitute grounds under the Missouri law.1 7
Our courts thus seem to have firmly established that jurisdiction to
divorce is founded upon the marital status being before the court because
of the domicile or residence of one of the parties. In so doing, it has long
been recognized that this status may be divided between two states where
the parties, after separation, have established separate domiciles.'1 While
the domicile of either party may confer jurisdiction in the interstate sense,
however, the Missouri courts have restricted their power to divorce to
cases where the plaintiff is the domiciliary, holding that they are without
jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a non-resident where only the defend-
ant has a Missouri domicile' and that they cannot consider a counterclaim
or crossbill filed by a non-resident in response to the petition of a Missouri
domiciliary.2 0 These cases appear to be based solely upon statutory con-
siderations.
b. What constitutes domicile or residence
As already noted, residence and domicile are usually regarded as one
and the same by the Missouri courts.2' In order to establish a domicile, two
15. § 452.040, RSMo 1959. Kruse v. Kruse, 25 Mo. 68 (1857); Phelps v.
Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952); Pate v. Pate,
6 Mo. App. 49 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
16. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 185 S.W.2d 870 (Spr. Mo. App. 1945);
Walton v. Walton, 6 S.W.2d 1025 (St. L. Mo. App. 1928); See also Werz v. Werz,
11 Mo. App. 26 (St. L. Ct. App. 1881) where the court treated the statute as
jurisdictional, but also as subject to waiver.
17. Hays v. Hays, 324 Mo. 810, 24 S.W.2d 997 (1930).
18. Howey v. Howey, supra note 5; State ex tel. Miller v. Jones, 349 S.W.2d
534 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).
19. Kruse v. Kruse, 25 Mo. 68 (1857); Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202,
246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952); McConnell v. McConnell, 167 Mo. App.
680, 151 S.W. 175 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912).
20. Price v. Price, 281 S.W.2d 307 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Phelps v. Phelps,
241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952); Pike v. Pike, 239 Mo.
App. 655, 193 S.W.2d 637 (K.C. Ct. App. 1946); Butler v. Butler, 252 S.W. 734
(Spr. Mo. App. 1923).
21. Supra note 12.
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elements must ordinarily exist: (1) actual bodily presence in a location,
and, (2) the intention to remain there either permanently or indefinitely.22
Regarding the first of these requirements, the presence must be actual
and constructive presence will not suffice. 23 The presence need not be con-
tinuous however, even when meeting the statutory requirement for a year's
residence.24 Once the domicile is established, it is retained even during long
periods of physical absence. 25
While certain presumptions concerning domicile are sometimes held,26
it is always a question of fact to be determined by the court in Missouri27
22. Nolker v. Nolker, 257 S.W. 798 (Mo. En Banc 1924); Schneider v. Friend,
361 S.W.2d 308 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Scotton v. Scotton, 359 S.W.2d 501 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1962); Madsen v. Madsen, 193 S.W.2d 507 (Spr. Mo. App. 1946); Lewis
v. Lewis, 238 Mo. App. 173, 176 S.W.2d 556 (K.C. Mo. App. 1943); Bradshaw v.
Bradshaw, 166 S.W.2d 805 (Spr. Mo. App. 1942); Trigg v. Trigg, 226 Mo. App.
284, 41 S.W.2d 583 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931); In re Ozias' Estate, 29 S.W.2d 240
(K.C. Mo. App. 1930).
23. Pate v. Pate, 6 Mo. App. 49 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878). In this case a woman
sought to assert residence or domicile upon the theory that a married woman's
residence follows that of her husband without regard to her actual presence.
24. Scotton v. Scotton, 359 S.W.2d 501 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962); Grant v.
Grant, 324 S.W.2d 382 (Spr. Mo. App. 1959); Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App.
1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1954); Madsen v. Madsen, 193 S.W.2d 507
(Spr. Mo. App. 1946); Trigg v. Trigg, 226 Mo. App. 284, 41 S.W.2d 583 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1931).
25. This is particularly true of personnel in military service where the fact
of service would tend to rebut any intention to change domicile. Oliver v. Oliver,
325 S.W.2d 33 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); Barth v. Barth, 189 S.W.2d 451 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1945); Trigg v. Trigg, 226 Mo. App. 284, 41 S.W.2d 583 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931).
26. Missouri has recognized, on at least one occasion, a presumption of fact,
not law, that a residence once established is presumed to continue until a change
is shown. Gillip v. Butts, 77 S.W.2d 1014 (K.C. Mo. App. 1934).
The following presumptions have been recognized elsewhere and might, in a
proper case, be successfully advocated in Missouri courts:
(a) That domicile follows the place of actual physical presence, Burrs Adm'r
v. Hatter, 24 Ky. 721, 43 S.W.2d 26 (1931); Pattison v. Firor, 146 Md. 243, 126
At. 109 (1924); Stewart v. Stewart, 117 Ore. 157, 242 Pac. 852 (1926); In re Dor-
rance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 660 (1932).
(b) That a former domestic domicile is favored over an acquired foreign
domicile, Strathmann v. Kinkelaar, 105 Okl. 290, 233 Pac. 215 (1925); In re Lyon's
Estate, 117 Misc. 189, 191 N.Y. Supp. 260 (Supp. Ct. 1921), aff'd 192 N.Y. Supp.
936, 200 App. Div. 918 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1922).
(c) That domicile, once acquired is presumed to continue, Bassett v. Bassett,
68 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1946); In re Strebeigh's Estate, 176 Misc. 381, 27 N.Y.S.2d
569 (Surr. Ct. 1941); Smith v. Smith, 29 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941),
aff'd 35 N.Y.S.2d 725, 264 App. Div. 769 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1942).
27. May v. May, 294 S.W.2d 627 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956); Scotton v. Scotton,
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and must be both alleged and proved.28 The burden of proof is upon the
proponent of the divorce whether by petition or crossbill. 29
c. Problems with a divided res
Where jurisdiction to divorce is based upon the marital status being
before the court because one of the parties has domicile in Missouri, it
naturally follows that a sister state might have concurrent jurisdiction of
the marital status because the other party to the marriage is a domiciliary
of that state. If one of the states has rendered a final decree, the problem
is whether or not recognition of that decree is required under the full
faith and credit clause, discussed infra. The problem, however, arises: what
if both states should have a divorce action pending at once? This precise
problem confronted the St. Louis Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Miller v.
Jones.30 In that case a wife, whose domicile was Colorado, filed for divorce
in that state, obtaining personal service in Missouri upon the husband
was a Missouri resident. He immediately filed for divorce in Missouri and
subsequently obtained service by mail. The wife appeared specially and,
upon refusal of the trial court to dismiss the Missouri action, sought pro-
hibition in the appellate court. The court of appeals determined that pro-
hibition only tested the trial court's jurisdiction. The court reaffirmed
the principle that jurisdiction to divorce was quasi in rem jurisdiction
over the marital status based upon the domicile of either party and found
that both Colorado and Missouri had such jurisdiction to divorce, although
neither court could grant complete relief over questions of alimony and
custody and support of children.3 ' It therefore held that the trial court had
28. State ex rel. Stoffey v. La Driere, 273 S.W.2d 776 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954);
Goading v. Goading, 239 Mo. App. 1000, 197 S.W.2d 984 (K.C. Ct. App. 1946);
Amberland v. Amberland, 188 Mo. App. 50, 173 S.W. 104 (St. L. Ct. App. 1915).
Compare Kennedy v. Kennedy, 223 Mo. App. 1116, 23 S.W.2d 1089 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1920). The same requirement for alleging domicile is applied to a cross-bill.
Price v. Price, 281 S.W.2d 307 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Pike v. Pike, 239 Mo. App.
655, 193 S.W.2d 637 (K.C. Ct. App. 1946).
29. Gomez v. Gomez, 336 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. 1960); Hays v. Hays, 221 Mo.
App. 516, 282 S.W. 57 (K.C. Ct. App. 1926). This burden is to prove domicile by
the preponderance of the evidence. Lewis v. Lewis, 238 Mo. App. 173, 176 S.W.2d
556 (K.C. Ct. App. 1943).
30. 349 S.W.2d 534 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961). See also Coffey v. Coffey, 71
S.W.2d 141 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934).
31. The court noted that the minor child born of the marriage was with the
mother in Colorado, and commented that the Missouri courts did not, therefore,
have jurisdiction to determine the question of custody. It also commented that
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jurisdiction to proceed notwithstanding that the Colorado action was first
commenced and first served. It was stated that the trial court might stay
the proceedings pending the Colorado action or even refuse to entertain
the action, but that this was purely a matter of comity and within the trial
court's discretion.
2. Other Foundations for Jurisdiction to Divorce
a. Consent and jurisdiction in personam
An appearance in court of this state may, in some instances, confer
jurisdiction over the party in domestic relations affairs.3 2 It has ordinarily
been held, however, that a court with both parties before it is without
jurisdiction of the subject matter (the marital status) unless one of the
parties is a domiciliary3 8 A 1945 decision by the Springfield Court of Ap-
peals, however, cast a considerable shadow across this field. 4 In that case, a
soldier, who was apparently a non-resident, brought a divorce proceeding
against his non-resident wife. She filed an answer and motion for temporary
allowances. In reversing the trial court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction,
the court stated:
. . . defendant submitted herself to the Circuit Court of Pulaski
County, Missouri, by her answer and motion for temporary alimony,
and the Circuit Court . . . thereafter had ful venue in the case
and had the right and power thereafter to pass on the marital re-
lationship . . . regardless of ordinary jurisdiction, and we need not
consider the question of jurisdiction at all." (Emphasis added.)
No subsequent case following or commenting upon this decision has been
found.
On its face, this decision appears to hold that if both parties are before
the court, the question of jurisdiction need not be considered at all.
This case is completely inconsistent with the other cases in Missouri
and with the basic concept that jurisdiction of the subject matter (the
marital status) is essential. A clue to the decision may lie in the reference
to "full venue" in the quoted portion of the opinion. Apparently the acts
32. Weiler v. Weiler, 331 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
33. Wagoner v. Wagoner, 287 Mo. 567, 229 S.W. 1064 (1920); Phelps v.
Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952); Stansbury v.
Stansbury, 118 Mo. App. 427, 94 S.W. 566 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906); REsTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 111 (1934).
34. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 185 S.W.2d 870 (Spr. Mo. App. 1945).
35. Id. at 871.
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complained of had occurred within Missouri and the court, in applying
Section 452.040 RSMo (requiring residence in the county where the action
is brought), followed the line of decisions holding this to be a venue rather
than jurisdictional statute.3 6 Since venue may be waived the court found
that the trial court acquired venue and, in a momentary lapse, confused
venue with jurisdiction of the subject matter. The authorities cited by
the court tend to support this rationale of the case. 37
It seems very doubtful that this case will be followed in the future
and most probably it may be said that at least one of the parties must be
domiciled in Missouri in order to confer jurisdiction of the subject matter
upon our courts.3
b. Estoppel to deny jurisdiction
The doctrine of estoppel is sometimes applied to divorce suits. This
is not a matter of conferring jurisdiction upon a court which undertakes to
act in a divorce proceeding without jurisdiction, but is rather that a party
may not challenge or attack the court's jurisdiction by reason of his own
conduct and reliance of the other party. 9 It does not seem appropriate
here to go into the grounds for estoppel other than to point out this pos-
sible basis for a court's decree being effective, notwithstanding the absence
of jurisdiction otherwise.
B. Recognition of Foreign Decrees
1. Jurisdiction of Foreign Forums
Long before 1942 when the United States Supreme Court overruled
Haddock v. Haddock,40 and determined in W~im v. Nort. Carolina 141
that a decree based upon jurisdiction in rem rendered in the domicile forum
of one spouse, was entitled to full faith and credit, Missouri was recogniz-
36. See supra note 16.
37. The court relied on King v. King, 237 Mo. App. 764, 170 S.W.2d 982 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1943), and several similar cases wherein there was no question of domicile
within the state and the sole issue was venue under § 452.040, RSMo 1959.
38. A number of states do, however, accord recognition to foreign decrees
based upon jurisdiction of both parties in personam on principles of comity. 27B
C.J.S. Divorce § 343 (1959).
39. In Littlefield v. Littlefield, 199 Mo. App. 456, 203 S.W. 636 (K.C. Ct. App.
1918) a party who remarried because of a divorce decree was estopped from seek-
ing to set it aside. A similar reason was given for not permitting a party to chal-
lenge enforcement of an Ohio alimony decree in Hamill v. Tabbott, 81 Mo. App.
210 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899). See also Richeson v. Simmons, 47 Mo. 20 (1870).
40. 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
41. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
[Vol.,28
56
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss3/2
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ing such decrees.42 Our courts acknowledged that under the Haddock rule
they were not required to accord such recognition on constitutional prin-
ciples, but insisted that it was the policy of the state to do so on principles
of comity.43 The Williams case, which caused such consternation and con-
fusion elsewhere, must have been received by Missouri courts with a sense
of vindication. As a consequence of Missouri's early enlightenment, the
state cases following the rendition of the Williams case are merely a continu-
ation of the former policy on this problem, unmarked by the considerable
confusion of radical change and unsettled doctrine sometimes found in sister
states.44
It appears clear that the Missouri courts recognize the jurisdiction of
a sister state to divorce as being the same as that of our own courts, the
minimum requirement being that one of the parties be domiciled in the
forum granting the divorce, thereby conferring jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter, i.e. the marital status.
2. Effect of Pleading a Foreign Decree
When a decree of divorce rendered in a sister state is plead in a Missouri
court and is, upon its face, properly rendered by a court of competent jur-
isdiction in the sister state, it raises a presumption that the decree is en-
titled to full faith and credit in this state. If the spouse challenging the for-
eign decree appeared in the foreign proceeding, this presumption becomes
conclusive as to the jurisdiction of that court and proper service, in which
case collateral attack on these issues is precluded and the decree stands as
42. Howey v. Howey, 240 S.W. 450 (Mo. En Banc), cert. denied 260 U.S. 730
(1922); Barrett v. Barrett, 79 S.W.2d 506 (K.C. Mo. App. 1935); Howard v.
Strode, 242 Mo. 210, 146 S.W. 792 (1912); Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 1, 143 S.W.
458 (1911); Anthony v. Rice, 110 Mo. 223, 19 S.W. 423 (1982); Gould v. Crow,
57 Mo. 200 (1874); Hanna v. Hanna, 224 Mo. App. 1142, 32 S.W.2d 125 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1930); Keena v. Keena, 222 Mo. App. 825, 10 S.W.2d 344 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1928); Williams v. Williams, 53 Mo. App. 617 (St. L. Ct. App. 1893).
43. Howard v. Strode, 242 Mo. 210, 146 S.W. 792 (1912). The court stated,
242 Mo. at 225: "There is nothing in the Haddock case which in the slightest de-
gree seeks to control our policy in this regard. This policy violates no rights under
either the state or federal constitution." Accord: Howey v. Howey, supra note 5;
Wright v. Wright, 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d 870 (1942).
44. Leichty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 354 Mo. 629, 190 S.W.2d 201 (Ern
Banc 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 782 (1946); Keller v. Keller, 212 S.W.2d 789,
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (Mo. 1948); State ex rel. Miller v. Jones, 349 S.W.2d
534 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d
838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952); Butler v. Walsh, 235 S.W.2d 826 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951);
Wood v. Wood, 231 S.W.2d 882 (Spr. Mo. App. 1950).
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res judicata in Missouri.45 In cases where the spouse challenging the decree
did not appear, the presumption of jurisdiction is rebuttable and subject
to collateral attack as to both jurisdiction and notice.46 A decree of a sister
state is also subject to a collateral attack on the grounds of fraud in the
concoction of the judgment, irrespective of proper jurisdiction and service.47
3. Grounds for Collateral Attack
The Missouri courts have recognized three grounds for challenging a
foreign divorce decree pleaded in Misouri. As frequently stated, these are:
(1) fraud in the concoction of the judgment, (2) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and (3) failure to give due notice to the defendant.48
Evidence outside of the record of the former decree is ordinarily admissible
to support the attack on the foreign judgment.49 Further, if a Missouri dom-
iciliary brings a subsequent divorce proceeding here, the policy of our courts
is against a non-recognizable foreign judgment causing delay of the Mis-
souri proceeding" and even where a proceeding is pending in the sister state
45. Keller v. Keller, 212 S.W.2d 789, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 858 (Mo. 1948).
This decision involved a husband who took a temporary leave from his Missouri
employment to obtain a Nevada divorce. The court made it clear it did not be-
lieve he had established a bona fide Nevada domicile but stated that the wife's
appearance there gave her a day in court and precluded the Missouri court from
questioning the jurisdiction. This result was founded upon a federal case requiring
the extension of full faith and credit under like circumstances. Davis v. Davis,
305 U.S. 32 (1938).
46. Leichty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., supra note 44, attacked on service;
Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d 838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952)
attacked on jurisdiction; Hill v. Hill, 241 Mo. App. 243, 236 S.W.2d 394 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1951), attacked on service; Wright v. Wright, 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d 870
(1942), attacked on jurisdiction.
47. Roseberry v. Crump, 353 S.W.2d 825 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961), trans. to
court of appeals, 345 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1961). The court stated, 353 'S.W.2d at 827:
"There is no question but that the foreign judgment here was entered by a court
of competent general jurisdiction as to both subject matter and the persons." The
court nevertheless refused to recognize the decree because of fraud in the concoc-
tion. Picadura v. Humphrey, 335 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1960); Fadler v. Gabbert, 330
Mo. 851, 63 S.W.2d 121 (1933); Weiler v. Weiler, 354 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1960).
48. Roseberry v. Crump, supra note 47; In re Veach, 287 S.W.2d 753 (Mo.
1956).
49. Leichty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., supra note 44; Wright v. Wright, 350
Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d 870 (1942); Phelps v. Phelps, 241 Mo. App. 1202, 246 S.W.2d
838 (K.C. Ct. App. 1952); Butler v. Walsh, 235 S.W.2d 826 (Spr. Mo. App. 1951);
Hill v. Hill, 241 Mo. App. 243, 236 S.W.2d 394 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951); Daugherty
v. Nelson, 241 Mo. App. 121, 234 S.W.2d 353 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950).
50. Wright v. Wright, 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d 870 (1942); Coffey v. Coffey,
71 S.W.2d 141 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934). Both held that Missouri citizens would
not be required to go to other states to protect their rights but would -be entitled
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to set a fraudulent judgment aside, our courts will proceed without awaiting
such action.51 The burden of proof that a foreign decree should not be rec-
ognized, where valid upon its face, falls upon the party alleging its inval-
idity.5 2
a. Fraud in the concoction
The fraud contemplated as a ground for refusing to recognize the de-
cree of a sister state is not mere false testimony at the trial.53 Rather it
must be such a fraud in the procurement as tends to trick an adversary
out of a defense or to blind him to the pendency of the action. In the
recent case of Roseberry v. Crump,5 4 the Missouri court was asked to en-
force alimony provisions contained in a Kansas decree. At the time of the
rendition of the decree, both parties were Kansas domiciliaries and personal
service had been made upon the husband so that no question concerning
the jurisdiction of the Kansas court existed either as to the parties or the
subject matter. The evidence tended to show that at the time of the former
proceeding, the wife assured the husband that alimony would not be re-
quested and that he need not appear. A property agreement had been
entered into. Relying upon this, the husband did not appear and an award
of alimony was made. The court held that this was fraud in the concoction
or procurement and that the Kansas decree would not be enforced here
and was void. This ruling was made notwithstanding that the wife herself
was not the perpetrator of the fraud, but rather the Kansas court had in-
sisted upon awarding the alimony although it was advised of the previous
agreement.
The court in the Roseberry case also noted that the husband had been
immediately advised of the alimony award and had failed to appeal. It
ruled, however, that his subsequent negligence would not cure the defect,
51. Weiler v. Weiler, 331 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960). In this case,
an Illinois domiciliary wife obtained a divorce there by fraud. The husband, a Mis-
souri domiciliary, brought a proceeding to set the Illinois decree aside and also an
action for divorce in Missouri to which the Illinois divorce was pleaded in defense.
The court dismissed the wife's contention that the Missouri divorce proceeding
should have awaited the outcome of the proceeding to set aside.
52. Anthony v. Rice, 110 Mo. 223, 19 S.W. 423 (1892); See also cases cited
in supra note 46.
53. Wright v. Wright, 350 Mo. 325, 165 S.W.2d 870 (1942); Keena v. Keena,
222 Mo. App. 825, 10 S.W.2d 344 (St. L. Ct. App. 1928).
54. 353 S.W.2d 825 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961), trans. to the court of appeals, 345
S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1961).
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implying that the judgment was void rather than voidable because of the
fraud. 55
One is inclined to question whether this decision will be followed be-
yond the points it actually rules, that is, that portion of the foreign judg-
ment awarding alimony will not be enforced in Missouri. The author sug-
gests that had the husband been prosecuted for bigamy upon remarriage
the court might have treated the Kansas judgment as voidable only or have
held that the alimony portion of the judgment was divisible from the di-
vorce.
50
Another recent case dealing with fraud in the procurement is Weiler v.
Weiler.7 In this case a wife, found to be a domiciliary of Illinois, filed for
divorce in Illinois, obtained service upon the husband in Missouri. She then
agreed to drop the Illinois proceeding in consideration of the execution of
a deed. The husband, relying upon this, made no effort to answer or appear.
The court refused to accord the Illinois decree recognition in this state be-
cause of this fraud.
b. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
In view of Missouri's clear position regarding the requirement of dom-
icile within the forum in order to confer jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter of the action, very little need be added on this subject. Unless the party
challenging the foreign decree appeared and contested the proceeding in
the foreign forum,58 our courts will conduct an independent inquiry into
the foreign decree and will deny it recognition where jurisdiction is found
wanting."I
A different sort of question is presented, however, where a foreign
domiciliary has obtained a divorce in his own forum but failed to meet the
residence requirements of the local statutes. At least one recent case seems to
imply that our courts will inquire into the jurisdiction of the foreign forum
under its own statutory requirements and deny recognition if these re-
quirements are not met. 0
55. Id. at 829. In the court's language "... that defendant should have ap-
pealed in Kansas, even if true, will not put pulsating life into a judgment stillborn
because of fraud in its procurement."
56. That decrees are sometimes held to be divisible for the purpose of ex-
tending recognition to parts thereof only, see 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 350 (1959).
57. 331 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
58. See supra note 45.
59. See cases cited supra notes 42, 44 and 46.
60. Weiler v. Weiler, 331 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960). In that case a
wife, after separation, returned to her Illinois home which the court considered as
becoming her domicile. She did not, however, meet the residence requirement of
[Vol. 28
60
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1963], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol28/iss3/2
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
c. Failure to give defendant due notice
An attack upon a foreign decree for the reason that the foreign court
failed to give proper notice has been permitted in the Missouri cases.0'
Usually this situation has arisen where constructive service was had on the
defendant in the foreign divorce forum by reason of a false affidavit that
the plaintiff did not know the defendant's whereabouts. For this reason, the
cases dealing with defective notice have been filled with loose terminology
concerning "fraud." In a sense, this would be fraud in the concoction be-
cause it would tend to prevent the defendant from defending or to blind him
to the pendency of the action as discussed above. Yet the courts have treated
this as a separate ground for denial of full faith and credit.
Because these cases, in Missouri, have been restricted to a factual
situation emissive of a discussion of fraud, the question is left dangling as
to whether or not defective service, in the absence of fraud, would cause
the Missouri courts to deny recognition to a foreign divorce decree. Prob-
ably such recognition would be withheld and fraud would not be a neces-
sary element to an attack on the service made by a foreign court. This is
indicated where, after discussing fraud, the court in Leichty v. Kansas City
Bridge Co., stated:
a state must have sufficient control over the marriage status
of its residents to enable its courts to affect that status without
personal service if such service cannot be obtained. However, due
process requires that reasonable and good faith effort be nade
to notify the absent spouse. 2
The emphasis was added to the above quote by the Kansas City Court of
Appeals in the subsequent case of Hill v. Hill.63 There is at least a hint in
this language that the real basis for denial of full faith and credit where
service is defective is the absence of due process of law and not fraud. 64
one year required in that state. She filed for divorce in Illinois, making false affi-
davit that she had a year's residence there. There was no question raised that the
Missouri husband was not duly summoned. In treating this aspect of the case, the
court indicated a terminology of fraud. This fraud, did not, however, prevent her
from being an Illinois domiciliary, giving the Illinois court jurisdiction of the
marital status. The refusal to recognize the decree for this reason, therefore, must
be because the Illinois court had no jurisdiction under its own statutes rather than
in the interstate sense.
61. Leichty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., supra note 44; Hill v. Hill, 241 Mo.
App. 243, 236 S.W.2d 394 (K.C. Ct. App. 1951).
62. Leichty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., supra note 44 at 635, 190 S.W.2d at
203.
63. Supra note 61.
64. The position of our courts in other situations would tend to reinforce this
conclusion. In cases dealing with a motion to modify, where jurisdiction of the
1963]
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The foregoing suggests a second question. What if the foreign divorce
forum affords notice or service sufficient to meet the requirements of due
process, but does not comply with its own statutes? Will our courts ter-
minate its inquiry if due process is met or will it further inquire into the
statutory requirements of the sister state before according recognition? Ap-
parently this problem has not been met head on in this state in a divorce
proceeding. Other courts appear to be divided.65 A suggestion of the position
our courts would adopt may be found in In re Barger,"6 where in determining
whether or not to recognize a foreign adoption, the Missouri court looked to
the notice statutes of the decreeing forum and found they had not been com-
plied with. Recognition was denied.
If the defendant appears in a foreign divorce proceeding he normally
can not contend that there was a failure of notice in attacking the foreign
decree, r although this probably would not be a bar if his appearance were
specially made to contest jurisdiction."
III. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
Since an action for separate maintenance is primarily one seeking main-
tenance, support and alimony for the spouse bringing the action,69 this type
of proceeding is lumped together with those specific subjects."0
subject matter was acknowledged, our courts have indicated that the notice of the
proceeding must comply with due process. Green v. Green, 368 S.W.2d 426 (Mo.
1963); Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo. 583, 252 S.W.2d 323 (1952); Jack v. Jack, 295
Mo. 128, 243 S.W. 314 (En Banc 1922); Baker v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 322 (Spr.
Mo. App. 1954).
65. Holding that the statutes in the divorce forum must be complied with,
Corkum v. Clark, 263 Mass. 378, 161 N.E. 912 (Sup. J. Ct. Mass. 1928); Weiss-
berger v. Weissberger, 183 Misc. 1006, 53 N.Y.S.2d 42 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Roland v.
Roland, 244 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Morey v. Morey, 27 Minn. 265,
6 N.W. 783 (1880). Holding that due process without statutory compliance is
enough, Dilk v. Scott, 225 Ark. 861, 286 S.W.2d 9 (1956).
66. 365 S.W.2d 89 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963). This may be construed a dictum,
however, because the court also determined that the notice failed to accord due
process of law.
67. The Missouri courts have taken the position that an appearance confers
jurisdiction over the person and constitutes a waiver of the necessity for service or
notice. Nolker v. Nolker, 257 S.W. 798 (Mo. En Banc 1924).
68. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 211 S.W.2d 536 (St. L. Mo. App. 1948), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (Mo.
En Banc 1949). See, Divilbiss, Special Appearances in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REV.
533 (1962).
69. A decree is obviously unnecessary merely to permit the parties to live
separately.
70. In Missouri, this action may be brought as a separate proceeding, not in
conjunction with divorce. § 452.130, RSMo 1959.
[Vol. 28
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IV. ALIMONY, MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT AND ALLOWANCES
A. Jurisdiction of Missouri Courts to Make Orders
1. Proceedings Necessary
a. Temporary allowances and alimony
It seems to be fairly clear that the Missouri courts have jurisdiction
to make temporary allowances only while a proceeding for divorce or sep-
arate maintenance is pending and that once a decree is entered, jurisdic-
tion is lost.71 While alimony provisions made at the time of divorce may
be later modified, alimony may not be granted for the first time after the
divorce decree becomes final.7 2
b. Child support
The above mentioned rule is not true, however, in the case of child
support. In these situations the court may reopen the issue upon a motion
to modify, and make an award after the rendition of a final decree." This
is true even where the court did not originally have jurisdiction to award
support, but subsequently acquired jurisdiction by reason of the father
later being personally before the court,74 although it would not hold true
if his subsequent appearance were specially made for the purpose of only
contesting jurisdiction."
c. Marriage necessary
It is necessary that there have been a marriage, since allowances or
alimony cannot be granted prior to a finding that a marriage did in fact
exist.
76
71. State ex tel. Gercke v. Seddon, 93 Mo. 520, 6 S.W. 342 (1887); Williams
v. Williams, 349 S.W.2d 422 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Gross v. Gross, 319 S.W.2d
880 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); Schenberg v. Schenberg, 307 S.W.2d 697 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1957); Beckler v. Beckler, 227 Mo. App. 761, 57 S.W.2d 687 (K.C. Ct. App.
1933); Coons v. Coons, 236 S.W. 364 (K.C. Mo. App. 1922); Libbe v. Libbe, 166
Mo. App. 240, 148 S.W. 460 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912).
72. Smith v. Smith, 350 Mo. 104, 164 S.W.2d 921 (1942); Ruckman v. Ruck-
man, 337 S.W.2d 100 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960); Baker v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 322
(Spr. Mo. App. 1954); Stokes v. Stokes, 222 S.W.2d 108 (Spr. Mo. App. 1949).
73. Kelly v. Kelly, 329 Mo. 922, 47 S.W.2d 762 (1932); Laumeier v. Lau-
meier, 308 Mo. 201, 271 S.W. 481 (1925); Roberts v. Roberts, 292 S.W.2d 596
(Spr. Mo. App. 1956); Kaestner v. Kaestner, 228 Mo. App. 1043, 58 S.W.2d 494
(St. L. Ct. App. 1933).
74. Kaestner v. Kaestner, 228 Mo. App. 1043, 58 S.W.2d 494 (St. L. Ct. App.
1933).
75. Supra note 68.
76. Bradley v. Bradley, 295 S.W.2d 592 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956); Sams v.
Sams, 232 Mo. App. 376, 106 S.W.2d 524 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937).
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2. Jurisdiction in Rem by Attachment
The early Missouri cases indicated that an order granting alimony,
maintenance or support was strictly limited to situations where there was
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The distinct implication was made
that in a proceeding to obtain such relief, the plaintiff could not proceed
by attachment upon constructive or outstate service, to obtain an alimony
or support judgment limited to specific property within the state.7 7
This view apparently prevailed almost exclusively until 1952, when it
was indicated in State ex rel. Nelson v. Williams-s that in a suit for separate
maintenance, a judgment for support to a wife, in rem against specific
property attached might be possible on constructive service. In this in-
stance, separate maintenance was distinguished from divorce. Apparently,
alimony in divorce cases may not be based upon attachment of the
property of a non-resident found within the state, but no decision has been
found directly passing upon the point, except by dictum.7 9
3. Jurisdiction in Personam
With the possible exception made in State ex rel. Nelson v. Williams,
the general rule in Missouri is that any award of alimony, temporary
allowances, support or maintenance is a money judgment in personam.
As such it requires personal jurisdiction of the defendant and personal
service within the state.80
B. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Decrees
1. Status of Foreign Alimony Decree in Missouri
A foreign decree for alimony or support to which full faith and credit
is extended is viewed in Missouri as an ordinary money judgment. For
this reason a proceeding to enforce such a judgment in this state is con-
77. This rule was really one of dictum, however, because none of these early
cases involved a strict attachment proceeding bringing the property before the
court as contemplated by § 506.160, RSMo 1959. Chapman v. Chapman, 269 Mo.
663, 192 S.W. 448 (1917), where the court stated, 269 Mo. at 674: "There is
not in this State any law authorizing a proceeding against defendant's property
for alimony on constructive service of process." Ellison v. Martin, 53 Mo. 575
(1873); Elvins v. Elvins, 176 Mo. App. 645, 159 S.W. 746 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913).
78. 249 S.W.2d 506 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952).
79. Chapman v. Chapman, infra note 80.
80. Chapman v. Chapman, 269 Mo. 663, 192 S.W. 448 (1917); Moss v. Fitch,
212 Mo. 484, 111 S.W. 475 (1908); Ellison v. Martin, 53 Mo. 575 (1873); State
ex rel. Miller v. Jones, 349 S.W.2d 534 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Poole v. Poole, 287
S.W.2d 372 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956); State ex rel. Silverman v. Kirkwood, 230
S.W.2d 513 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950), trans. 361 Mo. 1194, 239 S.W.2d 332 (En
Banc 1951); Elvins v. Elvins, 176 Mo. App. 645, 159 S.W. 746 (St. L. Ct. App.
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sidered as an action for debt,"' and, as a consequence, irrespective of the
law of the forum where the judgment was rendered, it will not be enforced
here by jailing the defendant for contempt.8 2 It has also been determined,
for this reason, that a foreign judgment for alimony or support is not
entitled to the preference given to a similar domestic judgment in the
case of a garnishment; that is, the defendant may assert a 90% exemption
of wages against a foreign support judgment.83
2. Validity of a Foreign Judgment
The Missouri courts will inquire into the circumstances of a foreign
support or alimony judgment and deny it recognition if jurisdiction in
personam is found wanting.84 It does not appear that our courts have
had occasion to pass upon the question of whether or not they would
recognize a foreign alimony or support judgment against specific property
attached within the foreign forum and entered upon constructive service." '
It is unlikely such a situation would arise since once the property were
attached in a sister state, it would be difficult to bring the property to
Missouri. The converse of this situation has occurred, however. In Mc-
Daugal v. McDaugal,6 an Arkansas court had jurisdiction of a husband
in personam and by its decree incorporating a property settlement, affected
title to personal property in Missouri. In considering the validity of this
judgment in Missouri, the Missouri court held that the Arkansas judgment
was valid in this respect. The court employed the fiction that the status
of intangible personal property follows the domicile of the owner and
1913); Stone v. Stone, 134 Mo. App. 242, 113 S.W. 1157 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908);
Hendrix v. Hendrix, 103 Mo. App. 40, 77 S.W. 495 (St. L. Ct. App. 1903); Hamill
v. Tabbott, 81 Mo. App. 210 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899); Anderson v. Anderson, 55 Mo.
App. 268 (K.C. Ct. App. 1893).
81. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (En Banc 1920).
82. Roberts v. Stoner, 18 Mo. 481'(1853); Harrington v. Harrington, 233 Mo.
App. 390, 121 S.W.2d 291 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938); In re Kinsolving, 135 Mo. App.
631, 116 S.W. 1068 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909).
83. Harrington v. Harrington, supra note 82.
84. Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484, 111 S.W. 475 (1908); Ellison v. Martin, 53
Mo. 575 (1873); State ex rel. Miller v. Jones, 349 S.W.2d 534 (St. L. Mo. App.
1961); Poole v. Poole, 287 S.W.2d 372 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956); State ex rel.
Silverman v. Kirkwood, 230 S.W.2d 513 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950), trans. 361 Mo.
1194, 239 S.W.2d 332 (En Banc 1951); Stone v. Stone, 134 Mo. App. 242, 113 S.W.
1157 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908).
85. Many states employ such procedure as an in rem proceeding against the
specific property, 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 247 (1959).
86. McDougal v. McDougal, 279 S.W.2d 731 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
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held that jurisdiction over the owner empowered the Arkansas court to
affect the property as it desired.
It is well established that the Missouri courts will entertain a collateral
attack against a foreign judgment for support or alimony sought to be
recognized here, considering evidence outside of the record of the foreign
judgment. The grounds for such an attack are the same as with a foreign
divorce decree, i.e. (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) failure to give due notice
to the defendant, and (3) fraud in the concoction or procurement."' Where
a foreign court has jurisdiction, the mere fact that its substantive law,
as to when alimony may be allowed, differs from our own law does not
affect the recognition of the foreign judgment.s
V. MODFICATION
A. Continuing Jurisdiction after Decree
1. Duration and Nature of Jurisdiction
Once a decree of divorce or separate maintenance has been entered
in Missouri, our courts take the position that the jurisdiction which the
court had over the subject matter and parties at the time of rendition con-
tinues for the purpose of modification of the decree.8 9 This jurisdiction is
considered to continue until the death of one of the parties to the marriage,
at which time the original action becomes abated and the court's jurisdiction
accordingly is terminated.00 This continuing power of the court terminates
upon the death of either spouse, even as to the control of the custody of
children, notwithstanding that children are sometimes considered as "wards
of the court.""o1 No other ground has been found for terminating the court's
jurisdiction of parties and subject matter once a decree has been entered.
87. Roseberry v. Crump, 353 S.W.2d 825 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961), trans. to
court of appeals, 345 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1961).
88. McDougal v. McDougal, 279 S.W.2d 731 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
89. Krueger v. Krueger, 107 S.W.2d 967 (Spr. Mo. App. 1937); Haagen v.
Haagen, 11 S.W.2d 757 (St. L. Mo. App. 1928); Wald v. Wald, 68 Mo. App. 337,
151 S.W. 786 (St. L. Ct. App. 1912); Smith v. Smith, 151 Mo. App. 649, 132 S.W.
312 (Sp. Ct. App. 1910); Kaplun v. Kaplun, 227 S.W. 894 (St. L. Mo. App. 1920).
90. Shepler v. Shepler, 348 S.W.2d 607 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Heil v.
Rogers, 329 S.W.2d 960 (K.C. Mo. App. 1959); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 223
S.W.2d 841 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
91. Shepler v. Shepler, 348 S.W.2d 607 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); I re Wake-
field, 274 S.W.2d 345 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955), aF'd 365 Mo. 415, 283 S.W.2d 467
(Mo. En Banc 1955); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 223 S.W.2d 841 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1949); State ex rel. Walker v. Crouse, 240 Mo. App. 389, 205 S.W.2d 749
(K.C. Ct. App. 1947).
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Continuing jurisdiction as to both parties and subject matter naturally
implies that a subsequent change in domicile or removal from the state
will not adversely affect the court's power to modify. This has been the
view of the Missouri authorities. 92
2. Acquisition of Additional Jurisdiction
Where the original decree was based upon the court having only
jurisdiction of the subject matter (the marital status or res), empowering
the court to grant a divorce only, the appearance of the non-resident spouse
to bring a subsequent motion to modify may give the court jurisdiction
in personam. Such after acquired jurisdiction has been held to confer
power upon the Missouri courts to make an award of child support9 3 or
child custody 4 where they did not have such power in rendering the original
decree. Such subsequent awards must be based upon application contained
in a "counter" motion to modify.
3. Conditions Precedent to Modification
a. Notice to other spouse
While modifying a decree is, in a sense, a continuation of the court's
jurisdiction in an existing case, yet it is also in the nature of an independent
proceeding, requiring effective and reasonable notice to the other party. 3
While such notice is not jurisdictional9 and a new summons is not neces-
sary,97 strict proof of notice is required, particularly where the other party
is in another state.98 No special time element is employed so long as it
92. Middleton v. Tozer, 259 S.W.2d 80 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Drew v.
Drew, 186 S.W.2d 858 (K.C. Mo. App. 1945); Riesenmey v. Riesenmey, 236 Mo.
App. 551, 155 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941); Conrad v. Conrad, 296 S.W. 196
(St. L. Mo. App. 1927).
93. Kaestner v. Kaestner, 228 Mo. App. 1043, 58 S.W.2d 494 (St. L. Ct. App.
1933).
94. Sanders v. Sanders, 223 Mo. App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458 (Spr. Ct. App.
1929).
95. Jack v. Jack, 294 Mo. 128, 243 S.W.2d 314 (En Banc 1922); Hayes v.
Hayes, 363 Mo. 583, 252 S.W.2d 323 (1952); Williamson v. Williamson, 331 S.W.2d
140 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960); Baker v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 322 (Spr. Mo. App.
1954); State ex rel. Tatum v. Ramey, 134 Mo. App. 722, 115 S.W. 458 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1909).
96. Krueger v. Krueger, 107 S.W.2d 967 (Spr. Mo. App. 1937).
97. Baker v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 322 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954).
98. Williamson v. Williamson, 331 S.W.2d 140 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960). In this
case, the motion and notice to take it up were served in Georgia by a deputy
sheriff. Because the return was signed only and not verified, the court held proof
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provides an opportunity to appear and be heard. 9 The requirement is
basically one of due process of law: that the party be informed of the
character of the proceeding and have an opportunity to defend against it.100
b. Allegation of change of condition
A validly entered decree in a suit for divorce or maintenance, whether
entered by a domestic or foreign court, is res judicata as to the facts exist-
ing at the time of rendition. As a consequence, to empower a court to
modify such a decree, it is essential that the movant both allege and prove
a change in condition which occurred subsequent to the entry of the
original decree.101
4. Relief Which may be Granted
a. Child custody and child support
The Missouri courts have held- that they retain power to make such
modifications as may be required in child custody,10 2 and may also make
new provisions for child support in a modification proceeding.103
b. Suit money
When a modification proceeding is pending, the courts of Missouri
have held that they have the power to award suit money for this purpose.1 04
c. Alimony
The Missouri courts have held they have the power to adjust alimony,
upwards or downwards, in a modification proceeding.10 5 They have ruled,
99. Baker v. Baker, 274 S.W.2d 322 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954).
100. Green v. Green, 368 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1963).
101. Hayes v. Hayes, 363 Mo. 583, 252 S.W.2d 323 (1952); Martin v. Martin,
160 S.W.2d 457 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942); Foster v. Foster, 146 S.W.2d 849 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1940).
102. Middleton v. Tozer, 259 S.W.2d 80 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Drew v.
Drew, 186 S.W.2d 858 (K.C. Mo. App. 1945); Riesenmey v. Riesenmey, 236 Mo.
App. 551, 155 S.W.2d 505 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941); Sanders v. Sanders, 223 Mo.
App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929); Conrad v. Conrad, 296 S.W. 196
(St. L. Mo. App. 1927); Phipps v. Phipps, 168 Mo. App. 697, 154 S.W. 825 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1913); Meyers v. Meyers, 91 Mo. App. 151 (1901).
103. Bettinger v. Bettinger, 355 S.W.2d 354 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Kaestner
v. Kaestner, 228 Mo. App. 1043, 58 S.W.2d 494 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933).
104. Kaplun v. Kaplun, 227 S.W. 894 (St. L. Mo. App. 1920); Smith v. Smith,
151 Mo. App. 649, 132 S.W. 312 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910).
105. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (En Banc 1949);
State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, 257 S.W. 1047 (Mo. En Banc 1924); Carr v. Carr,
253 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1952); North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936);
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however, that where the original decree made no provision for alimony
they had no power to grant it at a later time by way of modification., 6
This appears to be based upon domestic statutes rather than interstate
considerations.
B. Jusrisdiction to Modify Foreign Decree
Where a decree of a sister state was rendered with jurisdiction of the
subject matter and parties, upon due notice and without fraud' in the
concoction or procurement, the full faith and credit clause requires that
it be acknowledged as res judicata over all issues therein determined or
litigated. As has been heretofore pointed out, the Missouri courts always
afford such recognition. But, as has just been noted, a divorce decree is
ordinarily a continuing question and a change in condition may warrant
a modification. In such a case, the original decree is res judicata only on
those facts existing when it was rendered. It follows, therefore, that full
faith and credit does not prevent a second- state from modifying the decree
of a sister forum if the second state has subsequently acquired the requisite
jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter and there has occurred a
change in condition affecting child custody, alimony or some such matter. '0
Missouri has adopted this position and will modify the decree of a sister
state if appropriate jurisdiction and cause exists.108
VI. VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT
Until recently, the Missouri cases relative to the validity or voidability
of a marriage celebrated- in a sister state or foreign country were somewhat
confused. It was fairly clear that if the parties were Missouri domiciliaries,
our courts would accept jurisdiction to determine the marriage validity or
to grant annulment, but it was not certain which law would be applied,
that of Missouri or that of the celebrating forum. 0 9 The more recent cases
Backy v. Backy, 355 S.W.2d 389 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962); Jenkins v. Jenkins,
257 S.W.2d 250 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953); Maxey v. Maxey, 212 S.W.2d 810 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1948).
106. See cases cited supra note 71.
107. The best known federal case to this effect is Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.
610 (1947).
108. Daugherty v. Nelson, 241 Mo. App. 121, 234 S.W.2d 353 (K.C. Ct. App.
1950); In re Leete, 205 Mo. App. 225, 223 S.W. 962 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920); In re
Steele, 107 Mo. App. 567, 81 S.W. 1182 (K.C. Ct. App. 1904).
109. Two cases were primarily responsible for this confusion. Westermayer v.
Westermayer, 216 Mo. App. 74, 267 S.W. 24 (St. L. Ct. App. 1924), dealt with a
situation where both parties were Missouri domiciliaries but were married in Illi-
nois. In annulling the marriage, the Missouri court evidently applied Missouri law
1963]
69
Anderson: Anderson: Personal Jurisdiction over Outsiders Symposium:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
in this field seem to establish that the substantive law of the place of celebra-
tion (lex loci contractus) will be followed in these cases, although Missouri
procedure will be employed.11o Such subsequent endorsement of this line
of earlier cases would indicate that this policy would prevail even where
the marriage thus recognized was strongly against the policy of this state.111
VII. ADOPTION
An article has been printed in another Symposium concerning the
Missouri requirements to grant an adoption.1 12 Only two additional com-
ments would seem appropriate in this regard. In one recent case where
the father of a child sought to be adopted in Missouri was a resident of
Texas, the Missouri court did look to the Texas law in determining whether
or not his consent was waived by abandonment. 1 3 Since the court found
there was an abandonment under both the Texas and the Missouri law,
it did not hold which was controlling. Another case which may have some
future significance in this field is a recent ruling that the prior approval
of another court which had previously granted a divorce and made a
custody award of the subject of the adoption was unnecessary in order
for the adoptive court to act."'4 This case dealt with two domestic courts,
but the rule might have application where a foreign court had decreed
custody.
Relative to the effect of a foreign adoption in Missouri, the only case
found on this subject indicates that the foreign adoption will be recognized,
but will be given only such effect as if it were decreed in this state."5
to determine that the marriage was voidable. In Gross v. Gross, 96 Mo. App. 486,
70 S.W. 393 (St. L. Ct. App. 1902), the same procedure was followed in annulling
a Russian marriage. In neither case was the law of the celebrating forum pleaded
or proved.
On the other hand, applying the law of the forum wherein the marriage was
celebrated were Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S.W. 175 (1915); Snuffer
v. Karr, 197 Mo. 182, 94 S.W. 983 (1906); Green v. McDowell, 210 Mo. App. 517,
242 S.W. 168 (Spr. Ct. App. 1922); Potievska v. Independent Western Star Order,
134 Mo. App. 471, 114 S.W. 572 (St. L. Ct. App. 1908).
110. Hartman v. Valier & Spies Milling Co., 356 Mo. 424, 202 S.W.2d 1 (1947);
Henderson v. Ressor, 265 Mo. 718, 178 S.W. 175 (1915), appeal dismissed 248 U.S.
536 (1918); Taylor v. Taylor, 355 S.W.2d 383 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
111. See, for instance Buchanan v. Harvey, 35 Mo. 276 (1864), indicating that
a polygamous marriage would be recognized if valid where entered into.
112. Cook, Adoption Revisited, 27 Mo. L. REv. 391 (1962).
113. In re Adoption of P.J.K., 359 S.W.2d 360 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
114. Pratt v. Pratt, 363 S.W.2d 54 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
115. Melek v. Curators of University of Missouri, 213 Mo. App. 572, 250 S.W.
614 (K.C. Ct. App. 1923); Steele v. Steele, 161 Mo. 566, 61 S.W. 815 (1901).
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This decision is in accord with the prevailing rule,11 but with the more
liberal attitudes of today concerning adoption and property rights, it may
be doubtful authority in the future.
With regard to when recognition will be afforded to a foreign adoption,
our law clearly indicates that a collateral attack will lie against a foreign
adoption sought to be asserted here on the same basis as against a foreign
divorce, even to the extent of inquiring into whether or not compliance
was had with the statutes of the adoptive forum.117
VIII. CUSTODY
A. Jurisdiction of Missouri Courts to Determine Custody
1. Jurisdiction in Personam over the Parents
The decisions indicate that the courts of this state will undertake to
determine the custody of minor children in a divorce or separate main-
tenance proceeding if they have jurisdiction in personam over both of the
parties to the marriage.118 This power will be exercised irrespective of the
physical presence or domicile of the child within the state." 9 In this regard
it has been held that a pleading filed by a foreign domiciliary with the
children in her custody in another state is sufficient to confer such jurisdic-
tion even though the foreign domiciliary does not physically appear in
the Missouri court and is herself a minor when filing such pleadings. 20
The Missouri courts have also held that jurisdiction in personam may
be acquired after the rendition of the original decree, thus permitting the
court in a modification proceeding to determine custody of the children.' 2'
2. Child's Domicile within Missouri
The Missouri courts have exercised the power to determine the custody
of minor children, when such children are domiciliaries of Missouri, but
116. 2 C.J.S. Adoption § 66 (1936).
117. In re Barger, 365 S.W.2d 89 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
118. State ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, 257 S.W. 1047 (Mo. En Banc 1924);
Weiler v. Weiler, 331 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960); Daugherty v. Nelson,
241 Mo. App. 121, 234 S.W.2d 353 (K.C. Ct. App. 1950); Drew v. Drew, 186
S.W.2d 858 (K.C. Mo. App. 1945); Sanders v. Sanders, 223 Mo. App. 834, 14
S.W.2d 458 (Spr. Ct. App. 1929).
119. Weiler v. Weiler, supra note 58; Drew v. Drew, supra note 58; State ex rel.
Shoemaker v. Hall, supra note 118; Daugherty v. Nelson, supra note 118.
This power is based upon the theory that what the Court is doing is fixing
the reciprocal rights of the parents. Jack v. Jack, 294 Mo. 128, 243 S.W. 314 (En
Banc 1922); Schumacher v. Schumacher, 223 S.W.2d 841 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
120 Weiler v. Weiler, supra note 118.
121. Supra note 94.
1963]
71
Anderson: Anderson: Personal Jurisdiction over Outsiders Symposium:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the court has not acquired jurisdiction in personam over both parents .12
The Missouri courts have indicated that they will exercise this power
even where the children are not physically present within the state, if
Missouri remains the children's domicile.
23
3. Physical Presence of Child within Missouri
A third foundation for jurisdiction has been found to exist in several
states other than Missouri. Bare physical presence of a child within the
state clothes the courts with sufficient interest in the child's welfare as
to empower a court to pass upon the custody question.12 4 No Missouri
case directly passing upon this point has been found, although there is
dictum to the effect that our courts might exercise jurisdiction under these
circumstances in an appropriate case.1 25
Neither have our courts indicated that personal jurisdiction of both
parents or domicile of the child are exclusive jurisdictional grounds for
custody determination. Whether or not the Missouri courts will adhere
to this dictum, however, remains to be seen.
B. Recognition of Foreign Decrees Deterining Child Custody
1. Jurisdiction of Foreign Forum
A 1958 decision by the Kansas City Court of Appeals appears to
indicate that there is no fixed rule as to when Missouri will extend recogni-
tion to a foreign custody determination. 2 This decision involved a Vir-
ginia decree wherein both the husband and wife were personally present in
the proceeding. The Missouri courts refused to accord this decree recogni-
tion, holding that it showed upon its face that the wife was a Missouri
resident at the time of the rendition. The children were not physically
present in Virginia at the time of the rendition of the decree. Thus it
appears that Missouri will not accord to a foreign forum recognition of
jurisdiction in the same situation where her own court will exercise jurisdic-
122. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (En Banc 1949);
Moss v. Fitch, 212 Mo. 484 (1908); Bernstein v. Bernstein, 351 S.W.2d 46 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1961); McCoy v. Briegel, 305 S.W.2d 29 (St. L. Mo. App. 1957); Crooks
v. Crooks, 197 S.W.2d 678 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946); Kaestner v. Kaestner, 228 Mo.
App. 1043, 58 S.W.2d 494 (St. L. Ct. App. 1933); Elvins v. Elvins, 176 Mo. App.
645, 159 S.W. 746 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913).
123. State ex rel. Stoffey v. La Driere, 273 S.W.2d 776 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954).
124. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 7 (1949).
125. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (En Banc 1949).
126. It re Rice, 316 S.W.2d 329 (K.C. Mo. App. 1958).
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tion. The court did not pass upon the question of whether the domicile
of the children continued in Virgina notwithstanding their physical presence
in Missouri. It would thus appear that there is no clear rule as to when
Missouri will extend full faith and credit or recognition based on comity to
a foreign decree so far as children are concerned. It would be difficult to
say that the federal cases establish any clear requirement in this regard.127
2. Collateral Attack
It does appear clear that Missouri will permit a collateral attack upon
a foreign decree on the same basis and grounds as in a divorce case. 128
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Considering the relative rarity with which conflict of law problems
have arisen in domestic relations situations in the past, the Missouri law
is remarkably well established. In our modem society with its lessening
emphasis on family stability1 2 and greater emphasis on a mobile population,
these problems may be expected to occur much more frequently in the
future. Barring some major reversal in this field by the United States
Supreme Court, little change may be anticipated in Missouri.
127. For a discussion of the federal cases, see Hazard, Preamable to Family Law
Chaos, 45 VA. L. REV. 379 (1959).
128. Howey v. Howey, 240 S.W. 450 (Mo. En Banc 1922). See also Daugherty
v. Nelson, supra note 118.
129. Perhaps this was best summed up in the revised modem version of
Goldilocks. It begins: Once upon a time there were three bears, a mama bear, a
papa bear, and a little baby bear by a previous marriage.
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